

1 Note: This is a draft of a chapter in a book I am working on. It is not intended to be a  
2 monograph, so I apologize for the tone and style (and use of references) not being what you  
3 would expect from an academic article. The chapter is going to be longer, but here I have  
4 tried to pick out the necessary parts to make a paper-length coherent argument.  
5

6 What is degradation?

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13 Writing in 1868, the physical geographer George Marsh opens his book *Earth as Modified by*  
14 *Human Action* with a discussion of the “Physical Decay of the Territory of the Roman  
15 Empire.” He claims that “more than one-half” of the former Roman Empire

16 “..is either deserted by civilized man and surrendered to hopeless  
17 desolation, or at least greatly reduced in both productiveness and  
18 population. Vast forests have disappeared from mountain spurs and ridges:  
19 the vegetable earth accumulated beneath the trees by the decay of leaves  
20 and fallen trunks, the soil of the alpine pastures...and the mould of the  
21 upland fields, are washed away; meadows, once fertilized by irrigation, are  
22 waste...rivers famous in history and song have shrunk to humble  
23 brooklets...the...diminished velocity and increased lateral spread of the  
24 streams which flow into [estuaries], have converted thousands of leagues of  
25 shallow sea and fertile lowland into unproductive and miasmatic  
26 morasses.” (p. xx)

27 He goes on to explain,

28 “The decay of these once flourishing countries is partly due, no doubt, to  
29 that class of geological causes whose action we can neither resist nor guide,  
30 and partly also to the direct violence of hostile human force; but it is, in a  
31 far greater proportion, either the result of man’s ignorant disregard of the  
32 laws of nature, or an incidental consequence of war and of civil and  
33 ecclesiastical tyranny and misrule.” (p. xx)

34 Nature was also understood as inherently stable, and always returning to equilibrium unless  
35 utterly destroyed. Marsh writes,

36 “The Earth was not, in its natural condition, completely adapted to the use  
37 of man , but only to the sustenance of wild animals and wild  
38 vegetation...In short, without man, lower animal and spontaneous  
39 vegetable life would have been practically constant in type, distribution,  
40 and proportion, and the physical geography of the earth would have  
41 remained undisturbed for indefinite periods...” (p. xx)

42 The book is an interesting mix of caveats about the limits of scientific and historical  
43 environmental knowledge, and a Christian and colonial worldview presented in scientific  
44 terminology. Over the years, as our scientific measurement and interpretive capacity has  
45 increased, some elements of this story have been abandoned or tempered, but most have clung  
46 on in different guises. Ecologists and conservationists no longer believe that nature is  
47 inherently stable, but the traces and structures of a Christian ontology inform the worldview  
48 of which environmental science is generally a part.

49 In 1977, as the idea of ecological science as the primary authority about the environment  
50 began to flourish, the botanist Ruggero Tomaselli returned to the issue of the declining  
51 environment in the region of the former Roman Empire:

52 “Over the centuries there has been increasingly serious interference with  
53 natural biological balances throughout the Mediterranean basin, which has  
54 impaired the original aspect of the countryside and brought about, through a  
55 constant process of deterioration, extremely precarious situations requiring  
56 urgent and appropriate remedies.

57 One of the problems preoccupying ecologists, economists and forestry  
58 workers, together with thoughtful people everywhere, is that of the  
59 degeneration of the Mediterranean maquis., which is so marked that entire  
60 regions which used to be evergreen are gradually being turned into desert.”

61 Just a few years later in 1983, the naturalist and conservationist Gerald Durrell, who had spent  
62 a large part of his childhood in another part of the Mediterranean, the island of Corfu, wrote  
63 about the beauty of the French equivalent to maquis, and the many animals and plants one  
64 could find there and in similar habitats in California, Australia, South Africa and Chile.

65 “The holm oak and other trees that are dotted about the terrain hardly ever  
66 grow to more than 12 feet high and the dry land is covered with wild herbs  
67 and heath...an astonishing variety of creatures inhabit this area. There are  
68 herds of wild boar and numerous forms of..reptiles...Many species of  
69 rodents thrive there also, and because of this you see a number of birds of  
70 prey, including quite rare ones...Such enchanting shrubland habitat goes  
71 under the name of “garrigue.”..The hot air was heavy with aromatic scents  
72 from wild herbs and busy with a constant humming and droning from the  
73 insect hordes” (Durrell & Durrell 1982, p. 63).

74  
75 Tomaselli (like Marsh, but with less historical nuance) attributes what has become known as  
76 the “degradation” of the Mediterranean maquis to woodcutting and agricultural practices  
77 starting with the Romans. Durrell was not unaware that the Mediterranean used to have more  
78 and larger trees and even wild lions. How then, could a sensitive naturalist immersed in  
79 Nature from his early life have been so enchanted by the state of the world surrounding him?  
80 What is it about degradation that he, of all people, could not perceive?

81 Many environmentalists explain this sort of thing by pointing to the psychological  
82 phenomenon known as the shifting baseline effect. This is the idea that whatever the state of  
83 the world is when we first observe it, this is what we consider to be good and appropriate.  
84 Ecologists thus claim that contemporary observers whose expectations are not set by historical  
85 conditions lose track of “How the World Ought to Be”. Under this view, Durrell is naïvely  
86 misguided when he appreciates a present that is less rich than another state of the environment

87 in that place, in the past. He should be depressed, in mourning, struggling with despair. He  
88 should be restoring the habitat, not celebrating it.

89 While the shifting baseline psychological phenomenon does exist, the assumptions  
90 surrounding it can be problematic. Why do humans (or, indeed, a human such as Tomasseli  
91 rather than one such as Durrell) have the last word on how the world Ought To Be or what  
92 kind of environmental condition is a Bad Thing?

93 *Defining good and bad ecological states*

94 Ecologists and conservationists have long struggled to come up with some kind of universal  
95 regularities of environmental dynamics that could be used to classify empirical observations  
96 of the relations between living and nonliving things. This search for universal regularities  
97 helped establish ecology as a science, rather than a branch of history (that is, natural science  
98 vs. natural history). While other hard sciences, like physics, are also interested in different  
99 kinds of states of matter, they do not assign these moral valences or hierarchies of  
100 anthropocentric desirability. Solids, liquids and gases, for example, are alternative states of  
101 matter without values attached to them. Entropy is not understood as a bad force, and  
102 governments and NGOs do not set up committees to guide its eradication. This value  
103 neutrality does not exist in ecology. What I will call ecological states—organizations of  
104 biotic and abiotic<sup>1</sup> things into dynamic groups with trajectories of change and  
105 transformation—are assigned a complicated set of valuations and degrees or kinds of  
106 desirability. This desirability, although usually corresponding to certain situated social  
107 preferences, is naturalised as also indicating what is good for Nature as a whole.

108 Many recent critiques of ecology have pointed to the ways in which biology and ecology  
109 incorporated socio-economic models that were popular in the 1700 and 1800s, in which the  
110 living world is understood as analogous to a household economy. However, I think this  
111 critique, while accurate, is a little behind the times. Many of the assumptions derived from  
112 this household economy worldview, such as equilibria and fixed species distributions, have  
113 been challenged on purely ecological or biological terms, and are being abandoned by  
114 ecologists. There is a new socio-economic model taking its place, which I call the state  
115 model.

116 In the state model of ecology-as-economy, the living world is understood as a subject of state  
117 bureaucratic management. This is not just the observation that the biological and ecological  
118 become objects of governance and state bureaucracy: rather, bureaucratic governance  
119 becomes the primary subject of ecology. The state's interests in resources, stability, resilience,  
120 economic growth, etc., are implemented via different readings of neoliberalism<sup>2</sup> that are  
121 folded into ecological data formats intended to be directly used by civil servants and  
122 bureaucracies to perform centralized efficient allocation of resources across the landscape.

123 The state model is primarily, but not only, implemented through methods of remote sensing

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<sup>1</sup> Biotic means living or dead, for example anything made with organic compounds; abiotic means everything not considered living or dead, such as rock or water.

<sup>2</sup> What is meant by neoliberalism is a complex set of claims that is not necessarily entirely coherent (see for example Mirowski 2013). Yet, as Mirowski discusses, the claims of neoliberalism have taken over theories and assumptions about nearly all aspects of vellus-haired ape behaviour, biological theory, etc., to the extent that they may be confused, at least in highly neoliberal economies like the US or Chile, with common-sense observations of “human nature”; neoliberalism has become an all-encompassing worldview in such contexts.

124 and spatial analysis. One of the specific claims often associated with neoliberalism is that  
125 markets, better than any other mechanism, perform efficient allocation of information: for this  
126 reason states often use economic concepts or mechanisms to arrive at the proper allocation of  
127 Nature to the territory. This is present in economic concepts like Natural Capital, or  
128 Ecosystem Services (now called Nature's Contributions to People). Nature's Contributions to  
129 People, originally a communication device for talking to businesses and state-level decision-  
130 makers when first presented in the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, over the last fifteen  
131 years made the transition to a major research paradigm or theory, and the main expression of  
132 the state model. It does not depend on household economy-style equilibrium and fixist  
133 assumptions about how Nature Ought to Be. The efficient spatial arrangement of ecosystem  
134 states, farmland, water, and cities that the Nature's Contributions to People framework  
135 projects may, rather, be inherently unstable and "unnatural," which makes it all the more  
136 important that we use optimization techniques to create and maintain it. Nature now has no  
137 inherent dynamics or trajectories, consisting merely of background conditions (temperature,  
138 precipitation, elevation, etc.) that need to be taken into account as parameters when  
139 calculating optimization scenarios. Nature has become nothing but a boardgame surface on  
140 which resources are placed.

141 Degradation, previously of particular interest to empires and in colonial and post-colonial  
142 contexts, has regained relevance under the Nature's Contributions to People approach.  
143 Degradation is a main form of bad ecosystem state in this perspective, and one of the first  
144 reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services<sup>3</sup> was devoted  
145 to assessing the current conditions of degradation in the world. Major global reports warn that  
146 degraded ecosystems, like the Mediterranean ones described by Marsh and Tomasello, are  
147 feared to lack the capacity to support human life; degradation may soon lead to the collapse of  
148 rainfall, soil formation, plant growth, and so on, resulting in mass starvation, disease, and  
149 armed conflict (IPBES 2018; UNCCD 2017). I argue that degradation, in the state model of  
150 ecology, can be understood either as an ecological state, or a process leading to an ecological  
151 state, that is unacceptable from the perspective of economic and development goals. This is  
152 not how these documents define degradation, because they define degradation as a pure  
153 ecology concept.

154 Degradation is usually defined in a pure-ecology way as a reduction in ecosystem  
155 productivity, through changes in species composition (usually losses in biodiversity), which  
156 are expected to be irreversible (IPBES 2018; UNCCD 2017). We might thus imagine  
157 degradation as a very specific case in which lower productivity, meaning conversion of  
158 carbon dioxide in the air to plant biomass, is aligned with decreasing biodiversity, meaning  
159 the number of species and evenness of their population sizes. There are plenty of ecological  
160 states where these two things do not coincide, i.e. biodiversity declines but productivity  
161 increases, or vice versa, or both are high together, so this could be a meaningful definition that  
162 forms a nice Venn diagram of things that are and are not degradation. On the other hand,  
163 what is meant by irreversible is not always very clear: when made explicit, this usually means  
164 that the ecosystem does not return to its immediately previous state within a few decades.  
165 Since ecological processes such as tree growth or peat layer formation can continue and  
166 mature over hundreds or thousands of years, a couple of decades is an ecologically  
167 meaningless timescale. This stipulation in the definition of degradation makes it clear that the  
168 concept is in fact designed to be relevant to socio-economic time frames.

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<sup>3</sup> Intended to be the equivalent to the IPCC, by summarizing consensus scientific evidence and alerting the world's governance systems to ecological crises.

169 To understand why degradation is defined in pure ecology terms within a state model that  
170 converts ecology into bureaucracy-ready material, we have to appreciate a parallel sociology-  
171 of-science force transforming ecology, which perhaps surprisingly has found plenty of  
172 synergy with the state model. This other important transformation of ecology is the  
173 progressive conversion of natural history into a hard science of ecology, which has been  
174 underway since at least the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century. One of the outcomes of the sciencification of  
175 natural history has been that explicitly qualitative, value-laden, historically contextual  
176 processes like those described by Marsh have been reorganized into strictly ecological, static,  
177 and universal categories. That is, the various deplored changes in the landscape of the  
178 Mediterranean stopped being facets of the instructive history of the Roman Empire, and were  
179 reconceived as a universal type or category of ecological state called “degradation”.  
180 Degradation as a pure ecology concept supposedly extracted from history and culture,  
181 formally exists without reference to particular relationships to humans. Ecology derives its  
182 credibility as science (rather than as history) from claims of timelessness, universality, and the  
183 use of stand-alone concepts that do not require socio-cultural-political-historical  
184 contextualization.

185 There is thus a complex synergy between the sciencification of concepts like degradation,  
186 which are made to appear to lack social-cultural-political-historical aspects, and the state  
187 model of ecology in which ecological states become things that can be efficiently allocated  
188 with and for market and governance mechanisms, rather than via any inherent dynamics  
189 particular to living things.

190 Certain ecologists have continued to insist that Nature does have its own dynamics and  
191 trajectories, which have traditionally been called “succession”, or on longer time scales, Earth  
192 system succession, which includes the evolution of new species and emergence of geological  
193 processes. In addition to being a challenge to approaches that treat ecosystems as inert things  
194 placed at will on a matrix or background, these claims have another cutting edge as well.  
195 They recuperate succession from being associated with descriptive natural history, and claim  
196 that it can be made to be part of a hard science approach to ecology because it has rules and  
197 regularities that can be quantified. Whether this is really true is another story.

### 198 **Degradation as overlapping ecological states and economic situations**

199  
200 My claim is that degradation is the dysfunctional overlap or interaction between ecological  
201 and economic or livelihoods systems. Thus, I propose that degradation occurs in every phase  
202 of the life-cycles, or succession, of ecosystems: it is not a specific ecological state or separate  
203 phenomenon from succession. It can be found all across processes of ecosystem change, in  
204 any ecological state. The dysfunctions described as degradation typically take the form of a  
205 loss, restriction, or reduced rate of circulation of resources needed for an economic system.  
206 Resources are, of course, not objective things given by the environment, but particular uses,  
207 transformations, and valuations of materials, which are highly contextual and subjective.  
208 Thus whether an ecosystem is understood to yield any resources is entirely relative to the  
209 economic/ livelihoods/ productive system in question.

210 There are at least four ways in which livelihoods resources become scarce. The first is the  
211 most obvious, that is, a simple result of overexploitation of the resource through the  
212 emergence of uncoordinated economic demand. Despite what one might think, this is by no  
213 means necessarily the most common socio-economic cause of resource scarcity. Rather, many  
214 resources disappear because they are regulated out of existence—for example, they become  
215 part of protected Nature or part of private property, and can no longer be accessed by most

216 people (legally). Other resources become scarce because some second resource is being  
217 extracted from the landscape, which has been reorganized to produce this second resource,  
218 and this leaves insufficient space, energy, nutrients, or ecological functioning capacity to  
219 produce the first resource. The last way that loss of resources happens is that ecosystem states  
220 change through succession, but livelihoods arrangements are static or change more slowly,  
221 and do not respond adaptively to the changing ecology.

222 Resource overexploitation is often discussed as a process leading to degradation, but resource  
223 loss by regulation and by land-use are rarely understood as or recognized as forms of  
224 degradation. However, if we think of degradation as a dysfunctional fit between economy and  
225 ecology, then all relationships in which some livelihood lacks its resources, for any reason,  
226 are functionally the same as resource over-exploitation<sup>4</sup>.

227 Next I discuss some case studies of the last three, less familiar, forms of degradation. Each  
228 case is highly contextual and relatively complex, underlining that degradation is everything  
229 except the application of a pure ecology definition to an ecological state. First, however, I  
230 start with a case in which despite persistent claims of degradation, the habitat in fact appears  
231 to be highly resistant to degradation.

### 232 *Bowal: Resistance to degradation*

233 Bowal, plural bowé, is a kind of grassland in West Africa. Bowalisation refers to the process  
234 of hardening of ferricretes or lateric crusts, these being soils formed by chemical weathering  
235 in the presence of iron in solution in water, usually over porous and sedimentary rocks. These  
236 crusts are covered only by thin layers of soil, and are found mainly on plateaus and hills in  
237 West Africa, interspersed with forests (Padanou et al. 2015). Bowalized soil prevents root  
238 growth and water retention, leading to bowé being dominated by annual dry-adapted grasses  
239 and scattered dwarf trees (Padanou et al. 2015). This also leads bowé to burn almost every  
240 summer, and can also lead to flooding or waterlogging at other times of year (Zwarg et al.  
241 2012).

242 In parallel to this geographic explanation for bowal distribution in the landscape, colonial  
243 observers as well as current development programmes have claimed that bowé are caused by  
244 fire, overgrazing, forest fragmentation from woodcutting, overpopulation, and exhaustion of  
245 agricultural soils. These observers claim that the poor soils and lack of continuous tree cover  
246 have been created by a few hundred years of occupation by local African populations, notably  
247 causing the dramatic provocation of soil erosion. According to Padanou et al. (2015), bowé  
248 are unsuitable for livestock production and the only thing that can be grown on bowalized  
249 soils are nitrogen-fixing crops, otherwise they are abandoned and fail to recover within useful  
250 timeframes.

251 Bowé have also been reinterpreted as an example of colonial and post-colonial perceptions  
252 that the local rural people are, through ignorance and vice, mismanaging a previously lush and  
253 verdant continuous forest (André et al. 2003; Ballouche 2016). André et al. show that in  
254 Guinea (and by extension, throughout West Africa) the soil qualities of the bowé and

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<sup>4</sup> Of course this depends on the perspective you take. From the perspective of a squirrel, it of course makes a difference whether local humans have overharvested all the walnuts so there are no more walnuts to be found, or just put a big wall around the walnut trees, because squirrels can climb walls. It also makes a difference to the walnut trees in question. One thing it probably does not make a difference to is the persistence of life on Earth itself. We could of course develop a multi-species concept of degradation, but I do not develop this issue in this particular paper due to lack of space.

255 landscape in general have existed since the last couple of million of years, strongly  
256 constrained by the underlying rock types as described above; moreover there is essentially no  
257 ongoing soil erosion due to these same characteristics. Traditionally, the local people use  
258 swidden rotations to grow fonio on bowé, followed by five to fifteen years of fallow. They  
259 supplement this by creating small fenced agroforestry gardens and woodlands in or near  
260 grazing areas, which are maintained with human and livestock feces, and other waste. It  
261 seems plausible that the failure to maintain crop fields on bowé, used as proof of their non-  
262 restorability in the ecological literature, is actually a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of  
263 traditional swidden fallow periods.

264 I suggest that bowal swidden farming is not on the verge of socio-economic collapse due to  
265 environmental degradation, but simply is not as economically productive as outside observers  
266 believe that their own farming systems would be, were they able to implement them. This is  
267 degradation as compared to a hypothetical resource production baseline. However, the  
268 geological and ecological resistance to more-intensive agricultural exploitation (that is, the  
269 essential unavailability of resources exploitable by intensive agriculture in bowal habitat)  
270 seems to prevent an economic mismatch of resource valuation and exploitation from actually  
271 being implemented.

272 *Espinal: Degradation by regulating resources of out of existence or access*

273 The changing fate of the ‘espinal’ silvopastoral woodland of central Chile is an interesting  
274 case in which changing understandings of what makes a habitat degraded, or whether it is  
275 degraded at all, make little difference to the way that degradation is imagined, mobilized and  
276 enacted from a socio-economic perspective. Central Chile, like many other semi-arid habitats  
277 of the world, was long described as degraded. The blame for this condition was placed on  
278 supposedly ignorant peasants and their supposedly irresponsible land-management practices.  
279 This discourse imagined mestizo peasant livelihoods practices as static, unadaptive versions  
280 of European peasant practices, unresponsive to and unaffected by historical events. This is  
281 certainly untrue however: the California gold rush of the late 1800s led to massive central  
282 Chilean deforestation to grow wheat to export to California. Once abandoned, wheat fields  
283 would have taken 50-100 years to return to a forested state. Land reform and its reversal in  
284 the mid-twentieth century also resulted in a large increase in fencing, parcelization of the land  
285 and probably thus forest fragmentation, and probably contributed to accelerating the  
286 conversion of latifundia<sup>5</sup> to industrial wine and fruit plantations<sup>6</sup>.

287 It was also claimed and generally believed by ecologists working in Chile that the principal  
288 tree in the espinal landscape, the acacia *Acacia caven*, called *espino*, was brought to Chile by  
289 indigenous peoples or colonists from the Chaco (where it is also found), making it “invasive”.  
290 With the excuse that espinal is a non-native tree formation, and degraded, the government has  
291 allowed it to be converted to industrial agriculture without compensation using a tolerated  
292 loophole in environmental regulations (which was finally closed in 2021).

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<sup>5</sup> Large estates owned by colonist families, on which mestizo peasants who were essentially serfs worked. They did not own any property and were often paid in kind and kept in debt to the *patrón*. Land reform in the 1950s and 1960s confiscated many latifundia (*fundos*) and turned them over to peasant cooperatives. After the coup in 1973, many cooperative *fundos* were reappropriated and either returned to their original owners or sold to friends of the regime.

<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately I am not aware of any historical ecology studies of the impacts of economic developments and social reform policies on landscapes in the region.

293 After several decades of conservation neglect and habitat loss, espinal woodlands were  
294 discovered to be spontaneously undergoing succession to more-biodiverse native and endemic  
295 hard-leaf woodlands (Hernández et al. 2016; Root-Bernstein et al. 2017). This is because  
296 shade and moisture-loving endemic hard-leaved trees establish under the canopies of  
297 *espinos*—the opposite of what had been thought to happen—thus increasing tree density and  
298 forming small patches of forest-like conditions which gradually expand. After the forest has  
299 been razed, the espino is the primary early-succession tree species present in central Chile  
300 capable of establishing in full sunlight. It is, however, a hardwood tree, and thus grows  
301 slowly. Establishment of hard-leaf forest trees under *espino* canopies is also dependent on  
302 connections between woodlands that are made through the bodies of wild animals like birds  
303 that move seeds around, but also, since all large wild herbivores are extirpated from the  
304 region, through silvopastoralism itself: cattle move larger seeds, their herbivory may open  
305 forest tree germination spots under *espinos*, and when they are exposed to woodlands as  
306 juveniles they learn to eat around tree seedlings (which lack sugar) which may actually benefit  
307 the seedlings (Root-Bernstein et al. preprint). They also eat all standing grass and herbs, and  
308 may disturb leaf litter layers, both of which can contribute to the progression of espinal  
309 succession towards forest by preventing high-heat wildfires. However, the 50-100 year  
310 successional process will have given the impression that peasants, by creating and subsisting  
311 in espinal landscapes, degrade their own means of subsistence.

312 Funding through the UN REDD+<sup>7</sup> program, the UNCCD (United Nations Convention to  
313 Combat Desertification) mechanism, and the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on  
314 Climate Change) mechanism require that Chile develop plans for dryland conservation,  
315 degradation control, and restoration. This has forced the state to develop conservation and  
316 restoration plans for espinal. As part of these plans, traditional land-management practices,  
317 including silvopastoral cattle husbandry and leaf litter collection, have been targeted for  
318 eradication on the grounds that anthropogenic influences must be removed in order to restore  
319 forests (because humans and their ecological influences are bad). In a political context in  
320 which subsidies of the rural poor and smallholders are no longer considered desirable,  
321 peasants will be incentivized to folklorize their livelihoods for tourism. While I cannot assess  
322 whether folkloric tourism will end rural poverty, it does seem possible that the elimination of  
323 peasant livelihoods will actually *create* degradation of espinal and forests in two ways: firstly  
324 it will create woodlands in which peasants cannot access any resources for their traditional  
325 livelihoods, and secondly (due to the resulting accumulation of ungrazed grass and  
326 uncollected leaf litter) it will probably lead to increasing intensity and frequency of wildfires  
327 which will likely result in a state of low biodiversity and low productivity that takes many  
328 decades to reverse. In this sense, the debate about degradation in this region is, and always  
329 has been, a purely social and economic argument about how to eliminate the problem of the  
330 rural poor, cloaked in ecological concepts.

331 *The Chaco: Allocation of part of the landscape to one economic model leaves insufficient*  
332 *space or energy to produce other resources for other livelihoods*

333 The Chaco of Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, provides an example of how  
334 economics makes a material difference to ecologies—and not only in the obvious sense of  
335 how much habitat can be destroyed through resource extraction. The Chaco is a seasonally  
336 dry woodland type that formed a large block to the south-west of the Amazon tropical forests,  
337 covering 1,200,000 km<sup>2</sup>. When models suggest that the Amazon will suddenly flip into a

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<sup>7</sup> A funding mechanism to plant trees and/or prevent forests from being cut down, funded through global carbon markets or government subsidies.



338 degraded dry state due to deforestation, it would presumably resemble the Chaco or the  
339 Cerrado, the other large seasonally-dry forest south of the tropical forests. Seasonally-dry  
340 forests, as the name suggests, are dry half the year and wet the other half. Since the  
341 Pleistocene more or less, the Chaco has been a mosaic of grasslands, shrublands, and  
342 woodlands (Abril & Bucher 1999).

343 What is meant by degradation in this case starts with historical logging for picket fences and  
344 railroad ties starting in the late 19th century, extraction of tannin from trees, and  
345 intensification of the formerly extensive, low-input ranching (Murgida et al. 2014; Bonino  
346 2006; Bucher & Huszar 1999). Recently, further deforestation takes the form of conversion  
347 of timber forests and ranching lands to agriculture, for wheat (now largely abandoned)  
348 (Belotta et al. 2006) or soy (Murgida et al. 2014; Bonino 2006; Bucher & Huszar 1999).  
349 Logging was selective and preserved tree seed sources until the 1990s, when the use of  
350 bulldozers and fire to clear land for agriculture became widespread, reducing forest recovery  
351 and continuity (Belotta et al. 2006).

352 Rural peasants, a mestizo population, have recently expanded into the Chaco, first as cattle  
353 ranchers, and then, following overgrazing, as herders of browsing goats (Bucher & Huszar  
354 1999). These rural peasants also, it is reported, no longer create degradation by deforestation  
355 but by collecting water in depressions they dig, called *puestos*, next to their villages. This  
356 alteration of the landscape is attractive and usable by some species, and unattractive or  
357 unusable to others. Bird diversity increases near *puestos* (Macchi & Grau 2012), but they are  
358 avoided by peccaries and jaguar. The livestock that use the *puestos* are also understood to  
359 locally alter vegetation composition, promoting spiny and succulent species, and reducing fire  
360 frequencies, by eating all the non-spiny and flammable herbs. Here, the reduction in fires is  
361 considered bad by ecologists, since fires caused by lightning or humans were common in pre-  
362 colonial times and plants are adapted to them.

363 Bucher & Huszar (1999) point out that the degradation of the environment via the *puesto*  
364 system corresponds to a degradation of the economic system. Influxes of mestizo peasants to  
365 the Chaco since the 1800s rapidly over-exploited timber and other forest resources that did not  
366 promptly re-accumulate, leading to widespread poverty and subsequent out-migration. These  
367 authors describe a form of restoration (the “Salta method”) they have tested over 20 years that  
368 removes deadwood, thus reducing the populations of a rodent that lives in it and eats tree  
369 seedlings, and keeps cattle at very low densities only to act as seed dispersers. To address  
370 economic degradation, they consider how remaining local peasants, currently using the *puesto*  
371 system, will make a living in the restored landscape. They conclude that a mix of shrub and  
372 deadwood conversion to charcoal, selective logging, and extensive low-intensity livestock  
373 production yields almost 4 times the current income per hectare. Thus, both the economic  
374 system and the ecology could be restored together. However, it requires a substantial  
375 investment up-front and operates at a loss for the first 10 years. This, the authors recognize, is  
376 unattractive or impossible for peasants, without state support.

377 A noted degradation researcher who as a student was involved in assessing the ecological  
378 impact of the Salta method and comparing it to the *puesto* system, notes that both were quite  
379 biodiverse, but that this is now irrelevant since both have been replaced by industrial  
380 agriculture (Bestelmeyer 2014). He and other commentators note that the characterization of  
381 *puesto* systems as degraded helped justify their conversion to industrial agriculture.

382 Since the Salta method has not been invested in, restoration of Chaco forests is carried out by  
383 removing livestock and preventing logging for timber or charcoal production (Abril & Bucher

384 1999), which whatever its effect on ecological processes (probably mixed), reduces peasant  
385 access to livelihoods resources. While eradication of peasant livelihoods is, as always, treated  
386 as within the scope of ecological restoration, eradication of industrial agriculture is treated as  
387 a politico-economic issue outside the scope of ecological restoration, or perhaps simply  
388 outside the scope of the imagination. A study of the Chaco from a decade after the paper on  
389 the Salta method (Boix & Zinc 2008) is a good example of this. They propose to optimally  
390 allocate space in the Chaco to industrial crops (soy and others), traditional subsistence farmers  
391 doing what they already do, and conservationists. Conservationists, in their simulation model,  
392 are given the degraded land to make it productive through ecological restoration (at which  
393 point it is presumably allocated to soy production). This illustrates the scope of state-model  
394 approaches to restoration and conservation planning.

395 All of these approaches seem to ignore another facet of degradation in the Chaco. The  
396 Guaraní and Nivacle are two indigenous peoples of the Paraguayan Chaco<sup>8</sup>. The colonization  
397 of Guaraní and Nivacle lands, the incursion of Christian missionaries whose ideology went  
398 hand in hand with the economic needs of the colonists for cheap labor, and the degradation  
399 resulting from deforestation and resource over-exploitation has led to a smaller and smaller  
400 space left for their own livelihoods practices. They can no longer sow fields in the forest,  
401 hunt, gather, or pasture-- through a combination of lack of access to land and forests which  
402 are now private landholdings, and missionaries spreading an ideology of salvation from sin  
403 through wage labor. The Paraguayan ranchers who control the Chaco argue that lands left to  
404 the indigenous peoples and not converted to ranching or logging are “unproductive” or put to  
405 “irrational” use (Regher & Regher 2018). This productive use for the relatively small number  
406 of landowners also creates degradation from the perspective of the Nivacle and the Guaraní:  
407 some of the resources they used to live off may be there, but they have been excluded from  
408 them. The missionary teaching that wage labor is morally superior creates internal tensions in  
409 their communities, and is another way to degrade their access to their traditional resources.

410 *Shrub encroachment: static production practices in changing ecosystems creates degradation*

411 Shrub encroachment is an emblematic form of degradation, and a case in which some  
412 livelihoods are functional and others are not. Shrub encroachment is an increase in shrubs,  
413 which are perennial woody species: this does not necessarily lead to reduced productivity or  
414 reduced biodiversity. Shrub habitats are widely seen as inferior to both forests and grasslands,  
415 although in many areas of the world shrublands, woodlands and grasslands form mosaics and  
416 constantly interconvert under the influences of fire, rain, drought, herbivory, and soil nutrient  
417 cycling. The reason rangeland ecologists class shrub encroachment as degradation is because  
418 many ranchers believe that cattle, sheep, and other livestock cannot eat shrubs and that this  
419 reduces their productivity (weight gain).

420 Nevertheless, shrub encroachment is only degradation from the perspective of particular  
421 forms of ranching. This is particularly obvious when we note that in areas that have livestock  
422 but lack commercial ranching, the concept of shrub encroachment does not exist despite there  
423 often being a high abundance of shrubs. For example, in central Chile, despite centuries of  
424 small-scale cattle husbandry practices, and plenty of shrubs, shrub encroachment is never  
425 discussed or evaluated. On the other side of the Andes in Argentina, where ranching is larger  
426 scale and commercial rather than for subsistence, shrub encroachment in similar habitats is  
427 considered a degradation problem.

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<sup>8</sup> All of the ecological literature on the Chaco is from Argentina. However, the history and social situations in the Paraguayan and Argentinian Chaco appear to be generally similar.

428 One might assume that this is because commercial ranchers simply have more demanding  
429 standards of production efficiency and scalability than subsistence cattle raisers, or are trapped  
430 in a productivist discourse that undervalues shrubs on a symbolic level, somewhat like the  
431 *espino* in Chile. However, it is also possible that commercial ranching practices *create*  
432 conditions in which cattle are underproductive in the presence of shrubs. It is generally  
433 assumed that cattle only eat grass, but in reality free-range cattle eat a very wide range of  
434 other plants as well (Molnár et al. 2020). Whether or not cattle eat shrubs and other plants  
435 depends partly on the shrubs present and their specific palatabilities: many shrubs are full of  
436 chemicals called “secondary metabolites”, like the aromatic and bitter rosemary that we use to  
437 season food. Whether livestock eat these shrubs and flowering plants can depend on whether  
438 they are given the opportunity to socially learn from their mothers what to eat, which is not  
439 the case in many ranching systems which separate calves from mothers and keep cattle in  
440 feedlots for parts of the year or over periods of their lives. Some studies report that if cattle  
441 learn to mix aromatic shrubs or herbs with their other food, their digestion is improved and  
442 they gain weight faster (Provenza & Balph 1987). Economic imperatives for efficiency of  
443 production at particular scales, along with production methods that are tied to fixed properties  
444 and leave little leeway to allow cattle to select which vegetation associations across a  
445 landscape to forage in, are what seem to make a landscape with shrubs degraded.

446 *Borneo : Degradation can be avoided, under some conditions*

447  
448 The last case study from Borneo demonstrates that under certain social and political  
449 conditions, multiple changing economies and changing ecosystems can manage to coexist,  
450 adapt and persist, at least until industrialized production methods that produce a single  
451 resource for a single use and a single social group, with no exploitable excesses, come to  
452 dominate the landscape.

453  
454 In the kind of reflection that conservation ecologists rarely write, Putz has reflected on 40  
455 years of economic and development changes in an area of Borneo that he visited repeatedly<sup>9</sup>.  
456 There, the indigenous Dayak peoples, who had long lived from hunting, gathering, and  
457 swidden agriculture in the forest, were moved off of their land and given houses in  
458 prefabricated villages in the 1980s. Their land was converted into a logging concession.  
459 They did not switch entirely to wage labor, but negotiated with the logging companies on the  
460 basis of their traditional land rights. The logging companies gave them access to the forests,  
461 which they now reached more easily on logging roads and in logging trucks. By the 2000s,  
462 the Dayak were still hunting and gathering forest products, as well as reoccupying logged  
463 areas with swidden farming, selling off their traditional land-rights to oil-palm entrepreneurs,  
464 and receiving royalties from the logging concessionaire, as negotiated through a community  
465 conservation agreement. Meanwhile, some of the previously logged areas had been  
466 reclassified as an industrial plantation. Putz notes various forms of degradation: soil erosion  
467 from heavy equipment and deforestation on steep mountain slopes, land-cover change to  
468 plantations, loss of tree cover and disappearance of seed-dispersing birds and mammals. There  
469 are, of course, concerns that this forty years of economic symbiosis between the Dayak  
470 peoples and various Indonesian entrepreneurs and companies is not sustainable. Regrowth of  
471 the logged forests, in the context of apparently high rates of defaunation, could shift the  
472 succession of forests into states unsuitable for Dayak subsistence, and equally unsuitable for  
473 continued logging. The replacement of logging concessions with forestry plantations is not  
474 encouraging either: acacia plantations produce almost no secondary resources for anyone or

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<sup>9</sup> <https://aesengagement.wordpress.com/2018/07/31/fates-of-forests-in-borneo-a-40-year-retrospective/>

475 anything except the owner, which is compatible neither with conservation nor with the Dayak  
476 livelihoods.

477

478 Putz notes that the conservation solutions to preserve the forest that he promoted at different  
479 times over his career are situated in a socio-economic, political and legal context whose  
480 complexity and subtleties sometimes exceeded his knowledge. This is an important lesson. It  
481 is also instructive to note that indigenous peoples, when they have sufficient political rights or  
482 powers, may be able to negotiate a place for their livelihoods models, which may benefit from  
483 the roads, royalties, and markets of other models. Under the terms of the certification of  
484 sustainable logging practices at the site, the Dayak should not be able to use the forests for  
485 their subsistence. Yet they have managed to continue to do so, drawing on the kinds of  
486 discretionary capacities and local bargaining that get around rules designed to be globally  
487 applicable. Multiple economic models can coexist in ecosystems, although coexistence *per se*  
488 is no guarantor of long-term sustainability.

489

### 490 **The state model in the context of succession**

491

492 One of the problems with the state model approach to ecology is that its analytical approach is  
493 most suitable for minimizing the first and most obvious form of degradation, that is,  
494 uncoordinated demand for a resource leading to its over-exploitation. The state model, for  
495 example via Nature's Contributions to People landscape optimizations, aims to allow markets  
496 or other governance tools to rationally allocate and sustainably exploit resources. But it does  
497 so through the same mechanisms that create the other three forms of degradation. It regulates  
498 resources out of access through land-use allocation to conserved and restored areas,  
499 agriculture, industrial zones, and so on. It organizes landscapes around the production or  
500 allocation of particular resources or optimal trade-offs between them, and thus often leaves  
501 insufficient space, energy, nutrients, or ecological functioning capacity to produce other kinds  
502 of resources not valued by the state. The optimization model for the Chaco, for example, fails  
503 to provide landscape for Nivacle and Guaraní livelihoods. By ignoring the possibility of  
504 succession, the state model also reifies static economic states that may be optimized to  
505 mitigate the predicted effects of changes in climate (a background condition on the game  
506 board), but rarely considers adaptation to allow or respond to spontaneous change in the  
507 frequency, position, or identity of ecosystem states, such as shrub habitats.

508 I realize that my argument around what is and is not degradation, by focusing on social access  
509 to resources, may seem indifferent to what ecologists and conservationists are supposed to  
510 care about. Don't I care about species extinction, deforestation, and loss of ecosystem  
511 complexity and richness? Shouldn't I wish to protect them from conversion to resources,  
512 over-exploitation, and the destruction of life on Earth? On one level, yes: other species are  
513 beautiful and wonderful, and my experience of and ability to learn about the variety of  
514 species and ecosystems provides a profound epistemological exploration of life. On another  
515 level, I am arguing that ecological states, succession, and Nature itself do not aim to maximize  
516 biodiversity or productivity, or to ensure the maintenance of the identities of particular  
517 ecosystem states (stability or resilience). I argue that Nature has no inherent morality: it is not  
518 striving to achieve particularly abundant states, nor being ontologically thwarted by evil  
519 humans who drive it to uniformity, loss and shrinkage. I am arguing that from a pure ecology  
520 standpoint, we cannot argue that low biodiversity, low productivity and irreversibility are bad.  
521 The issue of why ecosystem states become smaller, simpler, less productive or less biodiverse,  
522 is indeed an interesting question, but to address it we need to remove the moral split between  
523 good and bad ecosystem states, and between the ecological definition of degradation and

524 succession<sup>10</sup>.

525 Nor do I wish to give the unqualified impression that peasants and indigenous people have  
526 some kind of inherent right to continue living as they always did, and that industrial and  
527 modernized production systems are somehow inherently illegitimate resource uses. The  
528 Dayak in Borneo have adapted their traditional livelihoods practices and economy in the face  
529 of a changing landscape. Indeed, all indigenous peoples as well as non-indigenous peasant  
530 populations have always had adaptive livelihoods, and have invented new practices,  
531 technologies, and resources, both responding to and creating new ecological conditions. The  
532 difference between the case of the Dayak and the cases of the Guaraní, Nivacle, and central  
533 Chilean peasants, are that the latter have not consented, through a political process, to have  
534 their livelihoods profoundly altered through socio-economic degradation of the landscapes  
535 where they live. Their landscapes were, and are, being altered through processes in which  
536 they had or have no political representation. Degradation can be an adaptive challenge, but it  
537 is a problem only when it is a problem of social and environmental justice.

538 Because human economies are also part of ecology, it is not the case that the socio-economic  
539 dysfunctions are simply at the level of discourse, or simply layered on top of an independent  
540 ecology. Rather, as in the examples of shrub encroachment, central Chilean woodlands, and  
541 Bornean forests, economic systems physically interact with ecologies through resource  
542 alteration—and this is more complex than simple extraction. By affecting how cattle forage,  
543 learn, and gain weight, how certain materials (dry grass, dead leaves) accumulate or not in  
544 woodlands, whether cattle are permitted to enter woodlands to carry out ecological functions  
545 that aid woodland succession, and what kinds of resources are produced by forests that  
546 regenerate after logging, fragmentation, and animal extirpation, economies and the landscapes  
547 they create directly affect ecological processes and thus the ecological states that develop  
548 through succession. Note also that social and cultural transformations of a purely symbolic  
549 order, such as teaching Nivacle and Guaraní communities that wage labor is morally superior  
550 to their traditional livelihoods, or incentivizing central Chilean peasants to folklorize their  
551 practices as touristic spectacles, can also cause or contribute to material alterations to resource  
552 availability. Thus while degradation is, I argue, primarily a problem of what is recognized as a  
553 resource, what is valued, and who is allowed to have access to their cultural or livelihoods  
554 resources and values, it also has ecological impacts. Degradation in my socio-economic sense  
555 will thus often lead to ecosystem change. This ecosystem change might correspond to  
556 degradation in the pure-ecology sense of low biodiversity, low productivity, and short-term  
557 irreversibility, but this is by no means necessarily the case.

558

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<sup>10</sup> This part of the chapter is left out of this paper for our purposes.

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