Circuits of Schooling and the Production of Space: The family, education, and symbolic struggles after apartheid

Mark Hunter

Dept. of Human Geography

University of Toronto, mark.hunter@utoronto.ca

WORK IN PROGRESS (comments very welcome but please do not cite without permission)

Abstract

Every weekday morning, in every South African city, scores of taxis, buses, and cars move children, black and white, long distances to attend schools. A simple explanation for the phenomenal rise of out-of-area schooling in South Africa—one perhaps unmatched anywhere in the world—is the end of apartheid’s racially divided schooling system in the 1990s. But focused on south and central Durban, this paper traces the emergence of ten distinct pathways that children take through different schools, referred to as “circuits of schooling.” The social-geographical inequalities that underpin schoolchildren’s movement today, it argues, are rooted in racial segregation under apartheid, rising inequalities within segregated areas from the 1970s, and a decisive shift from race- to class-based inequalities after 1994. However, rather than seeing children’s mobility as unfolding mechanically from social structure, life histories of parents and interviews with schoolteachers demonstrate that it is a) emerging from important gendered socio-spatial transformations in families/households; b) tied up with the reworking of symbolic power, including through the contested status of English language and schoolboy sports like rugby; c) and produced by (and producing) new struggles over space. As such, the paper proposes that the concurrent deracialization of schools, workplaces, and residential areas is marked by a new urban politics in which the “right to the city” and education are deeply intertwined.
“We are rough and tough and from the Bluff”—so goes the maxim about the former “white” suburb nestled between Durban’s busy port, the Indian Ocean, and the former “coloured” township of Wentworth. From June to August 2010, my then two-year-old attended a Bluff preschool close to where we stayed. As we arrived by car at around 7 a.m., many of her new friends disembarked from packed minibus taxis that had travelled from Umlazi, the half-million strong “African” township located some 20 kilometres to the south. The taxi drivers, dubbed umalume (uncle), are hybrid characters of the post-apartheid period: part driver, part babysitter, part commodified service provider, and part fictive kin. I later learned that one core reason why Umlazi families devoted so much money to omalume and school fees was so that their children could acquire better English than they would in local township schools. According to the preschool’s principal, places had opened up in this Bluff pre-school because several local preschools had aggressively poached white students and, in addition, hundreds of white children had moved to schools in the upper Berea part of central Durban. Similar scenes occurred across South Africa: Every weekday morning, in every city, scores of taxis, buses, and cars move children—black and white—long distances to attend schools. How can we understand children’s movement for schooling in South Africa today, and what are its implications for education and the city?

On the one hand, South African children’s commuting for schools is unremarkable. From London to Sydney to Toronto, middle-class parents devise strategies to enrol their children in schools perceived as better than local ones. Indeed, as market dogma swept across the globe in the 1980s, governments in the UK, the US, Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere made “parental choice” a central plank of educational reforms. However, the ending of racial segregation in South African schools in the 1990s, the still relatively small degree of residential desegregation, and the introduction of an educational market through fees mean that children’s out-of-area schooling has probably risen faster in South Africa than anywhere else in the world. One study, for example, found that only 18% of learners in Johannesburg’s Soweto Township attend their nearest school (De Kadt et. al. forthcoming).

Such movement marks an important form of urban politics. Although the legendary 1976 student uprising in Soweto Township instigated an unstoppable wave of anti-apartheid protests,

---

1 Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz 1995; Butler and Robson 2003; Butler and Hamnett 2007; Andre-Bechely 2007; Thrupp 2007; Butler and van Zanten 2007; Thiem 2009; Jeffrey 2010.
the connections among the city, education, and politics remain understudied in democratic South
Africa, as elsewhere. Scholars of liberal democracy have certainly long debated the potential that
schooling holds for social transformation, with the optimism of both liberal and some radical
scholars contrasting with the pessimism of those arguing that education merely reproduces class
inequalities (compare Freire 1970 and Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). In turn, critical urban
studies, addressing the urban potential for social transformation, have demonstrated how social
relations are indelibly tied to the ever-contested (social) “production of space”—or, put another
way, “the right to the city” (see Lefebvre 1971; Soja 1989; Harvey 2008). Yet bringing together
the city and education, this paper aims to show how contestations over urban spatiality are today
fundamentally implicated in the transformative potential of schooling and vice versa. The
concurrent deracialization of schools, workplaces, and residential areas, it argues, is marked by a
new urban politics in which the “right to the city” and education are deeply intertwined.

Analysis of labor market data in South Africa has demonstrated a decisive “post-Fordist”
shift from the 1970s away from manufacturing and toward service work (Crankshaw 2008;
Selzer and Heller 2010). Another well-studied area is the slow but not insignificant rate of urban
racial desegregation (for Durban, see Schensul and Heller 2011). Putting the two themes
together, work in Johannesburg has convincingly demonstrated that a multi-racial upper middle-
class is becoming increasingly concentrated in securitized enclaves in the city’s north, the
location of most of the city’s high performing schools (Crankshaw 2008; Selzer and Heller
2010). While Durban is somewhat similar in that it has seen the growth of service-sector
companies (and gated communities) in the north and west and the sharp reduction and
casualization of manufacturing work in the south, my focus here is not on residential
deracialization, as important as this is to urban politics. Indeed, by focusing on children’s
mobility for schooling—and specifically the institutions of the family and schools—I hope to
emphasize the importance of not only changes within places, but also to changing connections or
relations between places.² Testimony to how some children straddle Durban’s geography today,
the degree of racial mixing in former- white, Indian, and coloured, schools is generally higher
than the level of desegregation in surrounding residential areas (compare with Denmark Rangvid

² Integral to this perspective is the “relational” view of space, which perceives places as never being simply
bounded, but always being connected through movements and social relations; in the context of scholars’ historical
emphasis on segregation in South Africa, this approach is especially important to contemporary urban analysis (see
Hart 2002; Nutall and Mbembe 2008).
2007, and the U.K. Burgess, Wilson and Lupton 2005). Probing why and which students access out-of-area schools, we shall see, opens a revealing window into how command over space and social power are becoming connected in new ways. Specifically, I identify ten circuits of schooling—a term coined by Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz (1995), who first noted the differentiated nature of schooling mobility by showing that higher-income parents in London were more likely than working class parents to utilize non-local schools.

With out-of-area schooling already an important theme, educational scholarship in South Africa has persuasively made the point that a race-divided system has now given way to one that benefits the rich regardless of race (Chisholm 2004; Soudien 2004; Vally 2007; Lemon 2004, 2005; Fataar 2007, Woolman and Fleisch 2006; Soudien 2004; Lemon 2004, 2005; Bray et al. 2010). Most studies also highlight the nuances of this overall picture by showing the continued cultural hegemony of whiteness in former white schools (e.g., Battersby 2004; Vandeyar 2008); certainly, despite affirmative action policies in the post-apartheid era, whites appear to have quite successfully moved from “lower middle” and “middle middle” class jobs into “upper middle” class work (see for Johannesburg Selzer and Heller 2010). However, building on this work, I give special attention to two less commonly considered questions vital to understanding schooling and cities in South Africa and, arguably, in other settings: first, what difference does the (very often non-nuclear) family make in terms of schooling, as it is typically in the household/family that decisions on schooling choice are made and resources are mobilized; and second, in addition to academic status, what symbolic processes are producing schooling hierarchies that motivate children to travel to “better” schools.

In terms of the first question, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu famously challenged the liberal conviction that public education promotes social equality by showing how middle-class families endow children with dispositions such as language skills and a sense of entitlement (in a “habitus”) that enable them to better navigate educational institutions (Bourdieu and Passeron
According to Bourdieu, the perceived independence of educational institutions and qualifications in society allows for class privilege to be “misrecognized” as different educational outcomes appear to result from individuals’ inherent attributes (“s/he is naturally bright”). Yet, in contrast to this ideology of equality, apartheid’s educational policy explicitly penalized those categorized as African “in accordance with their [limited] opportunities in life,” in Verwoerd’s infamous words. This racialized history, and the political opposition it engendered, mean that most black South Africans today do not “misrecognize” (in Bourdieu’s terms) why black students living and schooling in previously designated black areas typically have worse schooling outcomes. It follows that the breakdown of apartheid segregation inevitably meant that families would attempt to access schools in parts of the city previously reserved for other “races.”

However, beyond these rather general contours, we need to interrogate the specific connections among families, class, and schooling choice in South Africa. Although Bourdieu’s work—and other related work, including that on circuits of schooling—differentiates household by either class (Ball, Bowe, and Gewirtz 1995; Butler and Robson 2003) or class and race (Lareau 2003), the implicit assumption is that households are internally structured along the lines of a nuclear family. For instance, Bourdieu used the father’s occupation as a sign of a family’s social class (Bourdieu 1984, 13). Such an assumption might be justified when marriage rates are high and men are co-resident breadwinners. Yet scholarship on the African continent has long expressed the family’s/household’s complex forms, such as showing how migrant labor systems rooted in colonialism stretched households across vast geographical areas and kinship is now integral to the numerous informal economies in the city (see Spiegel 1995; Simone 2004; for brevity I use the terms family, household, and kinship somewhat loosely in this paper). This work is important because I will argue that dramatic recent changes to the household, including reduced marriage rates, are key to understanding schooling patterns and class formation today as

---

3 Many have critiqued Bourdieu’s work, usually revolving around his emphasis on social reproduction and not change; his characterizing of subjects as unreflexive (they acquire a “habitus” through socialization); his weakness in recognizing how class “intersects” with other social relations such as gender and race; and his frequent use of economic terms (like “capital”) that can imply a certain economic reductionism. See, for instance, Sayer (2005) and, with special reference to South Africa, the excellent recent volume by Burawoy and Von Holdt (2012). Although I question Bourdieu’s assumption of a patriarchal nuclear family in the subsequent discussion, it must be noted that his work on kinship in Algeria makes him one of the few scholars of education to have interrogated in detail the politics of kinship and marriage.

4 However, see Kros (2010) on how liberal anthropologists influenced apartheid’s ethnic educational policy.
well as women’s central role in this movement. Indeed, as families in many settings around the world have moved away from a nuclear form, it may well be that South Africa offers poignant methodological/theoretical lessons useful for understanding the changing connection among cities, families, and schooling.⁵

I turn now to my second major theme: understanding schooling hierarchies. The stark divergence in academic performance of South African schools occupies considerable media attention, and is usually attributed to the legacy of the apartheid system and/or failures of the new government to address it. Many of the best performing schools today are certainly the 7% that were formerly white, whereas Limpopo province’s eight-month delay in supplying students with textbooks in 2012 symbolizes the dismal state of public education in former African schools. Yet attention to children’s mobility for schooling reframes the central question away from measuring the overcoming of a “legacy” toward understanding the systemic way that schools operate today: When schoolchildren travel to move up the schooling hierarchy, they take fees with them, thereby expanding the gap between the worst and best performing public schools despite state efforts at redistribution. However, in moving toward this conclusion, we need to recognize that some high schools in both the Bluff and Umlazi do achieve close to 100% matriculation rates and yet are abandoned by local residents; thus, “non-academic” reasons are important for understanding out-of-area schooling. Indeed, in all societies, the demand for elite education is about more than simply securing better examination results: Education is a way for dominant groups to develop social networks and secure the benefits of what the state (typically) defines as a “prestigious” culture.

To address the apparent paradox of mobility even when local schools have high academic results, we need to probe how schools are part of the construction and maintenance of what Bourdieu (1991) calls *symbolic power* or Antonio Gramsci (1971), with more emphasis on subaltern agency, calls *hegemony.*⁶ Both Bourdieu and Gramsci were deeply concerned with how new nation-states with expanding educational systems—France and Italy, respectively—were

---

⁵ See especially Robinson (2006) and Parnell and Robinson (forthcoming) on “postcolonial” urban studies that draw from non-Western theoretical and empirical trends; for the neglect of households in critical urban studies, see Marston and Smith (2001) and Buzar, Ogden, and Hall (2005).

⁶ Despite well-noted differences between Gramsci and Bourdieu (see, for instance, Burawoy and Von Holdt 2012), both placed a heavy emphasis on language. Whereas Bourdieu published a volume on the subject (Bourdieu 1991), as Peter Ives (2004) pointed out Gramsci trained as a linguist, and “prestige” and “hegemony” were closely associated concepts in his early intellectual and political development.
immersed in struggles, including critical struggles over language, that shaped the cultural basis of symbolic power/the nature of hegemony in society. It was by no coincidence that the dialect chosen as “standard” (i.e., French or Italian) was spoken by the elites of these countries and given high value in the labor market. Similarly, we don’t have to search very far into South Africa’s history to see the power of the central state in attempting to define “prestige” through education policy. The National Party, coming to power on a wave of Afrikaner nationalism in 1948, legislated for the separation of Afrikaans- and English-medium schools in an attempt to promote Afrikaans (and by extension Afrikaners) at the expense of the dominance of English (and English speakers) in society (Malherbe 1977). Meanwhile, the 1953 Bantu Education Act effectively ended the long tradition of English-medium and high-quality education undertaken by Christian missionaries, instead forcing Africans into an ethnic straightjacket by promoting—while devaluing—African-language medium instruction.

Not surprisingly given this history, recent discussions have focused on the failure of national education policy to redress past cultural biases, such as by promoting genuine multilingualism that raised the value of African languages (Alexander 1989; Gilmartin 2004). I am not suggesting that this analysis should be abandoned as clearly the state does play a central role in defining “prestige” in any society. However, I argue that the symbolic-economic workings of south Durban’s circuits of schooling show how the city is actively embroiled in the definition and contestation of hierarchies of cultural prestige. Indeed, a nation state-centric approach would not explain why families in Umlazi and the Bluff typically give “good” English and the playing of “white” sports (e.g., rugby) as important reasons for abandoning local schools. The 1996 constitution, although extremely unevenly enacted, did endorse 11 official languages, including nine African languages. Moreover, as the white elephant stadiums built for the 2010 soccer World Cup attest, it is hard to argue that the state promotes rugby more than other sports, such as soccer. Yet moving to the scale of the city, we can see that Umlazi parents seek to overcome apartheid’s geography by placing their children not in local schools, which typically mix English and Zulu in lessons, but rather in “multiracial” schools, where teachers are native English speakers. For their part, white Bluff residents can seek a school with a strong rugby team because this symbolizes its success in relation to other former white schools, including its ability to maintain its “whiteness.” However, the mobility of some children and immobility of others create significant social friction in cities and are frequently challenged, making schooling a vital
form of urban struggle, including by poor residents who live close to good schools, such as shack dwellers.

In giving attention to questions of space and the institutions of schools and families, this paper draws on approximately 180 interviews with parents, former students, school principals, and teachers conducted in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012.\footnote{Specifically, a small household survey was undertaken that collected educational biographies. This was followed up with open-ended interviews, 50 of which have so far been undertaken in Umlazi and 30 in Bluff. I have also conducted 40 interviews with principals and teachers, 40 interviews in Umlazi specifically about out-of-area schooling, and 19 interviews with preschool workers in Wentworth. Research is ongoing and many of the interviews have not yet been fully analyzed.} The study has thus far focused on schools in three parts of Durban, South Africa’s third largest city located in the KwaZulu-Natal province. Umlazi is a township built for “Africans” in the 1960s. The “Bluff” is used here to indicate the former “white” area located between Wentworth and Durban’s port. The upper Berea in central Durban is the location of Durban’s oldest and most prestigious public schools. It should be noted that space restrictions limit me to giving only a partial analysis of the context. I do not consider private schools, although similarities between these and now semi-privatized public schools are growing. Spatially, little attention is given to Wentworth and Merebank, although they are very much part of south Durban’s educational system as indicated in the summary of the ten circuits of schooling. Indeed, for the purposes of emphasizing certain themes in this paper, I overstate the similarities between these two areas because, from the perspective of Umlazi students who now form a majority of school goers, the fees and travel costs to access Wentworth and Merebank schools are quite similar and the teachers are all native English speakers; in turn, many students living in these areas now study in former white areas (see Chari 2006 for differences between these two areas).

According to census statistics, the eThekwini municipality, which incorporates the geography considered here, has the following racial demography: 22% Indian (largely descendants from indentured laborers), 63% African, 11% white, and 3% coloured. Thus, Indian education is an area that requires special attention, including Islamic schools that have grown in number in recent years. Although this dynamic is not explored here, by noting the preference some parents have for the best schools located in Umlazi township, I am addressing the wider conceptual point that “prestige” is by no means uniformly associated with former white schools. A final limitation of this paper is that I focus mainly on boys’ schools. The strong influence of
the private English educational system on South African schooling, especially in the Province of Natal, yielded a large number of single-sex public as well as private schools, especially for English speakers (Morrell 2001). Girls’ schools face similar pressures to desegregate and introduce fees, although the relative unimportance of sports might explain why the financial and symbolical divisions between girls’ schools appears to be less pronounced than in the case of boys’ schools (in concrete terms, most Bluff residents will argue that a smaller gap exists between the Bluff girls’ high school and central Berea girls’ school).

Geographies of Education in South Africa: A brief overview and South Durban’s ten circuits of schooling

Historians have demonstrated the centrality of education policy to the apartheid government’s draconian—but at times paternalistic—policies that carved up cities into four distinct racial zones and forced Africans without urban rights into ethnic “homelands” (see Kallaway 2002; Hyslop 1999; Kros 2011). Implemented five years after the National Party was elected under the banner of apartheid, the 1953 Bantu Education Act severely limited the quality and geographical scope of education for Africans, but also initiated the era of mass schooling. If one reason for Umlazi’s development in the 1960s was the violent destruction of Cato Manor’s informal settlement, townships also met a pragmatic need for stable industrial labor. This is why a tolerance for secondary schools in townships coexisted at times uneasily with the state’s emphasis on placing post-primary educational institutions in ethnically demarcated homelands (see Hyslop 1999 for the Transvaal). Elsewhere in Durban, urban racial zoning meant that separate coloured and Indian areas were demarcated; schools in these areas were financed at levels higher than African schools, but considerably lower levels than white schools.

In the 1970s, Bantu Education faced intense political opposition, symbolized by the 1976 student uprising that began in Johannesburg’s Soweto township and challenged the government’s attempts to promote Afrikaans-medium education. Responding to this activism as well as unionization and skills shortages, the government and private businesses increased funding for schools in the 1970s, which was ultimately channeled into urban areas (Hyslop 1999). In addition, the training of thousands of African women as teachers and nurses in part to legitimize
the homeland system (Tilton 1991; on nurses see Crankshaw 1997: 161) provided significant outcomes for the present day, as I note later. Yet in political terms, this educational expansion stoked rather than quelled opposition to apartheid and, by the 1980s, school boycotts, strikes, and other protests made urban areas the center of anti-apartheid activities. Challenging efforts to keep Africans from urban areas, shack settlements grew dramatically in Durban and other cities from the 1970s. In 1986, influx controls were completely abandoned, causing an explosion of migrants moving to urban areas. In 1991, the Group Areas Act that had divided cities into four racially prescribed residential areas was repealed, marking the end of formal urban segregation.

Following the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1990, the net outcome of considerable flux in educational policy was that most former white schools (which had experienced dropping numbers) began to desegregate, introduce fees, and gain greater autonomy through school governing bodies (Lemon 2004: 270). These educational changes were consistent with a series of late apartheid reforms aimed at deracializing privilege—a trajectory largely continued by the democratic government after 1994 (see Marais 2001; Bond 2000). Indeed, the ANC-led government that took office sought not to fundamentally transform, but rather to modify the semi-privatization of education through three redistributive interventions: a funding formula that favored schools located in poor areas; legislation that no child could be excluded for not paying fees; and the designation of the poorest schools as “no-fee” schools (for overviews, see Lemon 1994; Chisholm 2004). Although some better-off black South Africans moved into Durban’s suburbs, sharp differences in house prices—especially when crossing racialized geographies—constrained a more widespread level of desegregation. Children’s mobility became the primary means for black South Africans to access schools funded at historically higher levels.

Today, children attending local schools in South Africa are generally the poorest (unable to move to a “better” school) or the richest (living in upper middle-class areas close to the “best” schools). The circuit of schooling in South Durban, which I describe below, involves children travelling from four “initiating” areas: 1) Umlazi (former African township); 2) Merebank and Wentworth (former Indian and coloured areas, respectively); 3) the Bluff (a predominantly
working class/lower middle class former white area); and 4) informal settlements\(^8\) (sites of generally the poorest urban dwellers, mostly African). Below, I present in diagrammatic and then summary form ten circuits of schooling for south Durban; please note that this is only a partial portrait aimed at capturing the main trajectory of schooling.

---

\(^8\) I include in this category informal settlements, which are scattered across the city, because they are vital sites of struggle over the “right to the city,” a point I return to later.
Table 1 Summary of Ten Circuits of Schooling in south and central Durban

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiating Site</th>
<th>Circuit</th>
<th>Family Dynamics considered in Paper</th>
<th>Symbolic Dimensions Considered in Paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umlazi Township</td>
<td>Umlazi students attend a series of poorly performing schools in Umlazi</td>
<td>Low marriage rates</td>
<td>Importance of English language teachers in multiracial schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students access the “best” secondary schools in Umlazi</td>
<td>Importance of women, especially teachers and nurses, to schooling</td>
<td>High status of local schools with good examination results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students attend Wentworth and Merebank schools (between Umlazi and central Durban in proximity and costs)</td>
<td>Some children living with or supported by fathers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students travel long distances to access former white schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wentworth/ Merebank</td>
<td>Wentworth and Merebank students attend local schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wentworth and Merebank students attend Bluff or other former white schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bluff</td>
<td>White Bluff students attend local Bluff primary and secondary schools</td>
<td>High marriage rates</td>
<td>Downgrading of Afrikaans-medium education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White students attend local primary schools, although at the secondary school level they move to schools in Berea</td>
<td>Former working class families attempting to move away from technical work.</td>
<td>Importance of rugby in signalling the success of former white schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poorer families, including single mothers, have difficulty mobilizing resources for out-of-area schooling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Settlements</td>
<td>Children of shack dwellers school in rural areas, perhaps being looked after by a grandparent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children of shack dwellers attend non-African schools in Durban when the settlement is located close to these areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Circuits of Schooling and the Production of Space

We can consider these circuits of schooling through three analytical themes: the family/household and class, symbolic struggles, and struggles over space.

1) The Family/Household and Class

Educational biographies conducted with families in Umlazi township demonstrate that schooling decisions are shaped by complex social undercurrents in the arenas of housing, inheritance, marriage, and patronage (including when domestic workers’ white employers can support the educational costs of an employee’s child—a mode of racial paternalism well-denoted by the isiZulu term umlungu wami, “my white person”). Here, two points illustrate my argument that
we need to consider schooling and the internally differentiated family in relation to one another: 
a) female teachers and nurses play a central role today in financing and motivating Umlazi children’s out-of-area schooling; and b) although a lower proportion of men’s income is typically spent on schooling, a father or his family’s support for a child—in the context of very low marriage rates—can be critical to children’s schooling mobility.

To proceed, we need to briefly excavate the gendered history of the Umlazi township. In the 1960s and 1970s, the promotion of the heterosexual nuclear families in townships became a key mechanism for segregating and stabilizing African labor—namely, a working man gained access to the house in which he lived with his wife and children. The main physical geography manifesting this vision was the four-roomed “matchbox” house (51/9 house), a recognizable structure in almost every township in the country. However, this position of townships as sites for industrial men and their families needed to be modified by recognizing four important developments. The first is the building of single-sex hostels in the township for migrant men, which I will not discuss further here. The second—and perhaps most understudied—is how urban women challenged or at the very least qualified the patriarchal vision of planners. The large amount of women working in Durban as domestic workers in the 1960s, a job that usually required a basic knowledge of English and thus some schooling, and the growing number of more educated teachers and nurses (enabled by the concentration of schools and hospitals in urban areas, and thus predating the wider expansion of this work from the 1970s) meant that a significant minority of women did access Umlazi’s houses as primary beneficiaries. Indeed, approximately half of all civil court cases in Durban from the late 1960s involved women applying for emancipation from Natal customary law in order to gain the right to access a house, and many other women registered houses under their sons’ names but remained de facto heads.9

Third, from the 1970s, social inequalities grew substantially within African communities (Crankshaw 1997; Seekings and Nattrass 2005). In Umlazi, the relaxation of the employment color bar and expansion of homeland bureaucracies enabled some residents to access larger houses built by private developers (by then the state had withdrawn from township housing) or to build elaborate extensions to four-room houses by then sold-off to renters. Fourth, although some residents climbed the employment and housing ladder, young men and women increasingly fell

---
9 This statement is based on perusing approximately 500 Bantu Affairs Commissioner’s Court Cases from 1966/7 found in the Durban Repository of the National Archives. This period was the height of Umlazi’s growth.
off it. Beginning with the recession in the 1970s, the unemployment rate, especially among young people, rose to over 50% in Umlazi. One consequence of the decline in manufacturing is that men became increasingly unable to pay *ilobolo* (bridewealth) and other marital costs; as a result, fewer than half as many black Africans are married today compared to the 1960s (Hunter 2010a). Taken together with the sharp rise in the cost of housing (a basic four-room house in Umlazi can cost between R100 000 and R400 000) and an oversubscribed public housing program that tends to build small low-cost houses far from income opportunities, many mothers of schoolchildren live in their parents’ or grandparents’ homes. This often leads to the building of small rooms behind the main house for a son and/or daughter. These side rooms (sometimes called “backyard shacks”) can also be rented out, including to rural immigrants seeking better educational opportunities.

The net result of this changing social geography is that, in Umlazi, few houses are led by industrial men, as planners had dreamed. In simple demographic terms, roughly twice as many women as men over the age of 65 are living in Umlazi, a major reason being men’s earlier death. Hence, women steadily gained a growing foothold in housing, not only as direct beneficiaries of homes, but as inheriting widows or daughters. Notwithstanding contentious claims for individual ownership (usually by male family members), daughters and sons typically have strong moral claims on the shared and continued use of *ikhaya* (the family house). Along with the growing economic role played by the “lower middle” and “middle middle” classes in townships especially after 1994—for instance service workers and technicians (see Selzer and Heller, 2010)—one of the most striking findings when visiting families with commuting schoolchildren is the frequent presence and contribution of a teacher or nurse, who might be a child’s mother, grandmother, or aunt. This group, which grew markedly from the 1970s, can be too poor to relocate outside Umlazi—especially if the house is not easily sellable—but is not prepared to tolerate poor local schooling (however, see Chipkin 2012 on those who do move to middle class suburbs to avoid family obligations). Yet the relatively high salaries of teachers and nurses are not the only reason for their importance to schooling. It is well established of course that women around the world tend to spend a higher proportion of their disposable income on children. In South Africa, the racially structured labor market meant that teaching and nursing were the highest status jobs for women under apartheid. This occupational compression, in turn, created important social networks premised on education and through which children’s education could
be discussed: as Meghan Healy (2011) shows in the case of Inanda Seminary School, for more than a century highly educated Christian women encouraged their children to attend school.

There is no space in this paper to go into detail about the way that longstanding inter-household economies incorporating children—of which marriage was the most important—interact with educational economies today, but it is important to point out that in Umlazi when most parents are unmarried, the role of fathers, and sometimes more importantly their family members (including female teachers and nurses), is important to the kind of education a child will access. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, children were central to the region’s labor-intensive agrarian economy. Indeed, there is a longstanding association between ilobolo (bridewealth) and rights over children (ilobolo could be returned if a woman was infertile). Some of this association continues to this day as there is still a higher chance in Umlazi than the former white areas that a child will live with his or her father’s family rather than his or her mother’s family in the case of non-marriage or divorce. Similarly, it is quite common for a child to live with his or her father if this facilitates access to better schooling. In one family I interviewed, the child lived with the father, who was located in Pietermaritzburg; in another family, the father’s family—a richer family that lived in the former white suburbs—took care of the child. Men’s ongoing support of children, including for school fees, can take the place of inhlawulo (“damages” payment for pregnancy) in legitimizing access to children; on the other hand, when men provide no support, education costs can be a motivation for a woman to take a father to maintenance court, and some do.

For white Durbanites, a group with of course equally diverse backgrounds, including a significant number who were born overseas and a noteworthy number of Afrikaans-English speaking unions, public education has played a critical role in differentiating learners by language or future occupation. If separate Afrikaans and English schools propelled language divisions, the establishment of George Campbell School of Technology in central Durban in 1963 signalled a greater emphasis on institutionalized technical education. At that time, Durban’s oldest and most prestigious English public school was Durban High School, which opened in 1866 (see Morrell 2001 on Natal province’s long tradition of British-influenced schools). The top academic Afrikaans school, opened in 1941, was Port Natal. Both are located in the Berea area and developed strong links to English and Afrikaans universities, respectively. The first Bluff
primary school was built in the 1930s; by the 1960s, the area had five primary schools, a boys’ and girls’ English-medium high school, and a co-ed Afrikaans-medium high school.

Across Durban, public schools were pressured by the government to enforce a “zoning” policy on only rare occasions. In Berea, one reason for this was that a large number of flats were built in this traditionally high-income area, especially in the 1960s, and schools demanded the power to selectively admit students, for instance by giving preference to sons of “old boys” (these flats are one reason why, after 1994, racial desegregation became quite high in Berea; see Schensul and Heller 2011). However, as lower Berea, which housed many Indian residents before the implementation of the Group Areas Act, became more of a working class white area than upper Berea, schools did enforce zoning when it served their interests. One former teacher of Durban High School told me that “every day we thanked the lord for Mansfield High School” (located down Berea hill, it took in poorer students). Thus, the overall lax zoning policy and a relatively efficient and cheap bus and train system enabled some mobility of white children for schooling, when the school’s and parents’ wishes overlapped. Yet on the whole, job reservations—whether in technical work or professional careers such as in the government—helped explain the lack of overall urgency around schooling mobility, at least compared to today (see the semi-autobiographical novel by Donkin 2011).

The Bluff contains a mix of flats, privately developed family houses, and historically employer-subsidized houses (the Railway and Harbours being a major employer, particularly of Afrikaans speakers). Its lower-than-average house prices for a former white suburb, as well as the tendency of lower-income white areas like the Bluff to be situated closest to black areas, enabled Bluff schools to desegregate relatively quickly. Indeed, the area’s schools attracted children from not only Umlazi but the adjacent former coloured area of Wentworth and the Indian area of Merebank. Although white parents still tend to invest in several local preschools and primary schools, many white high school students now attend Berea’s schools. It would be easy to put this movement down to racism, in the sense that white children and/or parents wish to avoid mixing with black parents and children. Terrible acts of verbal and physical violence against black students do still take place, of course. However, were this form of racism the only force at work we might have expected the Bluff’s Afrikaans-medium schools to have grown in popularity among whites as a way to exclude black Durbanites, who have never embraced Afrikaans. Some parents did indeed advocate for this path, resulting in bitter disputes. One
Afrikaans-speaking teacher at a Berea school recalled how Afrikaner parents sending children to English-medium schools were barred from positions of authority in the Dutch Reformed Church. Yet in the long run, Afrikaans-speaking parents largely abandoned Afrikaans schools (which became dual-medium) and moved their children to schools that were racially mixed, if predominantly (and viewed as culturally) white.

In contrast to Umlazi, where most parents of schoolchildren are neither employed in permanent work nor married, most parents in the Bluff have the capacity to organize and finance out-of-area schooling because of their historically privileged access to the labor market, their ability to use existing assets for income generation (e.g., through home and/or family businesses), their likelihood of being part of a dual-income marital family, and the priority in admissions that many former-white schools give to white students. It should be noted that black domestic workers, who themselves often try and place their children in local Bluff schools, play a critical role in meeting a “care deficit” created by families’ need to work longer hours to fund schooling or drive children to and from schools (public transport is not widely used). At the same time, the sharp rise in public school fees, especially at the most prestigious schools, means that children from poorer Bluff families can be forced to school locally. Tellingly, one teacher at a popular upper Berea school told me that his school is especially reluctant to admit single parents from the Bluff because of their perceived inability to pay. As this section has argued, the relationship between families and class in Umlazi and the Bluff helps account for children’s mobility/immobility. Yet it still doesn’t fully explain why parents and children demand movement or why certain schools are ranked higher than others. For this, we need to turn to how schools became differentiated in new ways.

2) Symbolic Power and Schooling

In 2012, a spat erupted between two KwaZulu-Natal boys’ schools that threatened to end all future sporting fixtures. The argument started when one school accused another of using lucrative bursaries to poach its best rugby players. A week later, another scandal hit the papers: Over-aged boys, some as old as 23, had been enrolled in high schools so that they could play on their rugby teams. As the rugby world digested these events, one Saturday afternoon in May
2012, two of the province’s old school rivals played a heavily anticipated match beamed live on satellite TV. In the packed school stadium, as the game kicked off, winds from a cold front buffered the rugby ball, and a defending player fumbled his catch. This proved to be a metaphor for not only his team’s subsequent drubbing, but also the sense among many watching the game that the losing team had dropped the schooling ball. As students cheered loudly from the stands—their attendance was compulsory—it was equally obvious that the winning team had many more white students than the losing team.

Sports are, of course, embodied in deep and contradictory emotions related to participation, winning, and the admiration of bodies (both by other men and the many well-dressed young women who watch schoolboy matches). Yet this rugby example points to wider shifts over the last two decades that can be captured in the changing priorities of many principals of former white schools: Their primary role is not educating students, but managing the admissions as well as financial and symbolic status of schools. As one principal from a business environment told me, schools need to brand themselves to attract the right clientele. I consider this question from the perspective of several of the former white schools in Berea that sit at the top of the schooling pyramid and draw white students from the Bluff. But I follow this by showing how most Umlazi parents imagine somewhat different schooling hierarchies. An important concern when defining these is the geography whereby children need to leave Umlazi to access a multiracial school—that is, a non-African school where the teachers’ first language is English.

**Why do white schoolchildren move from the Bluff to Central Durban?**

With very different social histories and (unlike firms) immovable built geographies, former white schools have adopted different strategies over the last twenty years (Hunter 2010b). However, some common tendencies remain. All have tried to manage desegregation in a way that maintains the school’s appeal to whites and attracts high-income parents, who will regularly pay fees and provide other support to the school. In part because of Durban’s longstanding class-geographies, the oldest secondary schools are located in Durban’s Berea area and have generally been more successful in this task than Bluff schools. Principals in the former conduct hundreds of admissions interviews to assess parents’ finances and students’ English and aptitude—namely,
the quality of their previous education. Schools also regularly ask applicants’ past schools for information on whether fees were paid on time, actively solicit gifts from former students and charitable trusts, and forge alliances with other schools (especially feeder schools and schools they feed into). Enforcing zoning when they wish to keep out undesirable students (e.g., children of domestic workers who give their employers’ addresses as their place of permanent residence), these schools can also aggressively market themselves outside their local zone. One marketer from a high school with whom I spoke said he travelled as far as Pretoria (some 650 kilometres) to recruit students. Indeed, many KwaZulu-Natal boys’ high schools, as well as a number of girls’ schools, employ full-time marketing personnel, and some employ full-time sports coaches. Moreover, one school marketer estimated that approximately 1 in 3 boys admitted to the “best” former white boys’ secondary schools in KwaZulu-Natal are given some kind of financial bursary, usually related to sports.

I lost count of the number of times parents and Principals told me that, “a boy’s school is judged by the results of its rugby first team.” From the perspective of white parents and scholars from the Bluff, a school’s success in rugby, the quintessential white sport, can signal its capacity to navigate the new world of desegregated schooling. I use the word *capacity* deliberately as parents typically hope to avoid the disruption caused by changing schools; thus, what is important is a school’s direction (e.g., is it “going black”?) as much as its current standing. Of course, in many respects, rugby has long unified white South Africans, not only because of the passionate support South Africans have for the national Springbok team, but also due to the sport’s high profile in boys’ schools—whether private or government, English or Afrikaans (in the UK, rugby matches are played mainly among private schools). However, whereas in the past English and Afrikaans schools on the Bluff would compete in bruising matches (dubbed the “Boer War”), today Bluff boys travel to access English-medium schools that excel in rugby. Hence, Afrikaans speakers, as one native Afrikaans-speaking teacher told me, have either moved away from Durban to Afrikaans-speaking areas or “seen the light” and moved their children into English-medium schools. Such a trend, albeit obviously racialized to the core, can be justified and experienced in objective terms: The top status schools are much better financed today and do tend to have smaller classes, better facilities, and better academic results. By virtue of the money thrown at sports, they can also offer young men sporting opportunities, claiming that they are “more likely to make Natal (Provincial rugby team) at ____ School”.

I don’t want to naturalize or suggest that there are not exceptions to the logic that places rugby-playing schools at the top of this schooling hierarchy. Although rugby prowess is the most significant symbol of a school’s capacity for success, winning in other sports, having a good academic record, geographical proximity, and enabling the continuation of friendship groups are all reasons why students and their parents choose certain schools. In other words, a contingent, not absolute, relationship exists between rugby and a school’s status and finances. Moreover, rugby naturally cannot be simply equated with whiteness. Black students are well represented on many school teams, and the intimacy and teamwork required for success in the sport can help puncture racial bias.\textsuperscript{10} That said, one high school marketer told me that he felt pressured not to show too many images of black rugby players in promotional literature; indeed, the websites of former white schools invariably display photographs that overstate the number of white students studying at these schools.

Strong evidence of this powerful logic underlying schooling can also be found in the challenges faced by former white schools that brand themselves in different ways. Jansen and Vandeyar’s (2008) study charts a former white Afrikaans-medium school that chose not to preserve its whiteness by excluding black pupils, but instead adopted an image of openness and tolerance, changing its name to Diversity High and winning significant support from politicians, academics, and businesses. Although initially successful, it reached a tipping point as poorer and black students were admitted and white parents pulled their children out. Dolby (2001) recorded similar dynamics in her ethnography of a historically working class white school located in lower Berea. It should be noted that teachers and black students also mention that higher-income black parents desire predominantly white schools as they denote prestige and distinction; indeed, most former white schools have a significant proportion of black students (rarely less than 50%, with Indian and coloured students often admitted in preference to African students, whose presence most signifies a school “going black”). What makes bucking the symbolic links between whiteness and prestige so challenging is that the semi-privatization of education connects the symbolic and economic devaluation of schools in processes that can unfold quite quickly. When better-off parents pull their children out of schools, they divert resources that are not always

\textsuperscript{10} See MacGregor 2011 for a rich account. Her study also notes the importance of the Blue Bulls (provincial) team in financing schoolboys who move into nearby Pretoria schools, whereas in KwaZulu-Natal it is the schools themselves that meet this cost.
replaced by new learners due to rules that require schools to bear the full burden of fee remissions in cases when parents cannot pay.

**Why do schoolchildren move from Umlazi to “multiracial” schools?**

The smaller classes and better facilities found at former white schools are obviously important factors for Umlazi parents who choose them. Yet interviews highlighted one overriding motivation: English language acquisition. Even if some Umlazi parents can now earn high incomes, virtually all were schooled in all-African schools and thus denied access to prestigious English that can be passed onto their children. English is valued not only because it provides an entrance into elite business worlds, but also because it is increasingly important to lower-paid service work. Indeed, one of the few growth industries in South Africa for young people today is the telephone call center industry; graduates of multiracial schools, especially former white schools, have a distinct advantage in attaining such jobs (Hunter and Hachimi 2012).

Although former white schools are seen as bestowing the most prestigious white South African accent (Gilmartin 2004), many Umlazi parents send their children to the closer and cheaper coloured schools in Wentworth and Indian schools in Merebank. Research conducted in Wentworth in 2011 found that approximately 125 dedicated umalume taxis travel into the small location of Wentworth each day, mainly from Umlazi. Any movement outside Umlazi to a school with native English-speaking teachers amounts to a significant potential for intergenerational class mobility, which is perhaps why all Indian, coloured, and white schools are collectively called “multiracial” even though in some cases almost all of the students are now African. It should be noted that Umlazi parents with the means tend to send their children to schools outside Umlazi at young ages, even preschool age. Umlazi parents have an incentive to invest in English-medium schooling early not only because of English’s value in the job market, but also because access to future schools depends on English-medium interviews, a reference from a “legitimate” school, and—in the case of some schools—attributes such as a knowledge of rugby (see De Kadt et. al. 2011 on the higher rate of mobility for schooling in Soweto among primary schoolchildren).
3) Symbolic Struggles and Contested Urban Space

It now remains to be seen how social frictions fetter the wheels of these circuits of schooling—first, with respect of the identified themes, how do English and sports (especially rugby) form part of symbolic or classificatory struggles (Bourdieu 1984: 309, 479)? Since educational qualifications are now open to everyone regardless of race—and, thus, are “devalued”—historically privileged groups (especially whites) and other groups now able to access prestigious education (for instance, richer black students) have a strong interest in not only climbing further up the education ladder, but also promoting objective non-academic ways to maintain social hierarchies. The enhanced prestige attached to English, a language that most white students access from their families even before starting school, is certainly one reason why African-language (and we might add Afrikaans) speakers are said to do worse than English-speaking white children in former white schools (Gilmartin 2004, Battersby 2004; Soudien 2010). That said, acquiring English grants these students great advantages in the job market in comparison with students from similar backgrounds who do not attend these schools. As such, the dominance of English is by no means natural or simply the result of labor market shifts toward service work (although this is important), but the result of social struggles over the value given to language and accent. These struggles, as I have shown, play out in connected urban geographies and not simply in state institutions.

In turn, rugby prowess—at least in KwaZulu-Natal—serves to brand a school as “white” and maintain the selective admission of whites and non-whites of higher class into schools on objective grounds (see also Dolby 2001). Both Bluff and Umlazi students (see below) who access these schools gain important class advantages. Although the father of a current Bluff schoolboy might have studied at a technical institution and been employed in artisan work, Bluff boys’ schooling in Berea’s academic schools are socialized into generally English-medium networks, including “old boy” networks. The resultant consolidation of whites in a few of Durban’s English-medium public schools therefore serves to enhance social networks among groups previously divided by language (Afrikaans and English) or class (technical or academic). This is especially useful for accessing KwaZulu-Natal’s still white and English-dominated business world. As I note later, desegregation in these schools also allows for a select group of
black students to join these networks. The academic and non-academic privilege provided by certain schools helps to explain the finding that many whites have enjoyed intergenerational class mobility after apartheid, despite affirmative action policies. In contrast, those who remain in schools on the Bluff can struggle to find work. The ending of job segregation and thus sharp decline in the employment of white men in artisan positions is reflected in one Bluff family I interviewed where the “technically inclined” 23-year-old son was unemployed and lived at home. In another family, a young artisan and his wife had returned to stay with her parents after falling into debt. Indeed, it may well be that a certain convergence is taking place in that young men and women from poor Bluff and Umlazi families find it hard to secure work and establish an independent home.

Thus far, I have concentrated on the movement of scholars along geographical contours carved out by longstanding race- and class-related differences—namely, movement from black to white areas and poorer white to richer white areas. However, two groups that have low incomes but can still live in well-to-do areas are domestic workers and shack dwellers, both of whom have the legal right to access prestigious schools if they are nearest to their homes. I consider briefly the second of these as there has been a significant rise of informal/shack settlements since the 1970s, and these are perhaps one of the most contested spaces over the “right to the city” in South Africa today (Huchzermeyer 2004; Pithouse 2008). Because of the precarious nature of shack living and schools’ frequent efforts to exclude these city dwellers, many children born to people living in shack settlements stay with one or both of their grandparents in rural areas and are consequently educated in South Africa’s generally worse schools. As such, they are likely to repeat the poverty of their parents and attain only informal/casual work (Hunter 2010b). Meanwhile, the location of some shack settlements near former white or Indian areas means that some children do access a local school that offers much better education than they would have had in a rural area. The Abahlali baseMjondolo (“shack dwellers”) social movement emerged in one of central Durban’s oldest shack settlements (Kennedy Road) to fight forced removals; one reason for residents’ reluctance to be moved was that children attended local schools (see Stiegel 2006). This has also been recently reported in a
Johannesburg shack settlement. Additional examples of the entanglement of the politics of schooling and place-related contestations are evident. In Umlazi, the historical association among being black, being poor, and being located in a segregated place means that many class–race dynamics can be spoken of in terms of race: Middle class Africans are positioned as “coconuts” or they *zenza umlungu* (“make themselves like whites”) (McKinney 2007, Rudwick 2008). Zama Ngibi, 20, was one of the first residents from the area to attend school outside (in her case, in an Indian and then white school). She now says that she probably would not send her child outside the township, describing how people “think I am better than them.” People tell her, “you must go back to Umhlanga” (a suburb north of Durban). Another common derogatory term is *uyazitshela* (you are being arrogant, literally “telling yourself”). What is relevant here is that only the very richest residents can afford to relocate from the township. While a small number of exclusive privately developed areas exist in Umlazi, in the main rich and poor households live close to one another, attend the same churches, and shop at the same stores.

If Umlazi residents often affirm a strong aspiration for multiracial education, it is important to note that some students/parents do invest in local schools, especially schools with high matriculation results. Indeed, my research with approximately 50 families in a section of Umlazi (J) known for its good schools demonstrated that these institutions have highly selective admissions practices (including exams) that result in only a minority of local students actually attending them. The high value given to education in the best Umlazi schools is somewhat related to what some call “covert-prestige,” which contrasts with “overt prestige” (Trudgill 1972). Of course, we need to be careful about adopting a binary (i.e., overt/covert) framework; for example, the most prestigious Umlazi schools have long sought to promote instruction in the English language in part because final examinations are taken in English. Yet the important point is that prestige is always a matter of social struggle, and excellent local schools gain popularity, in part, because they are seen to challenge the hegemony of white education. Evidence for this


12 This opposition to outside schools can be read against a longstanding ambiguity among black South Africans to those overenthusiastically adopting “white” culture; in the 1960s Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje (1963) noted derogatory terms such as *ooscuse men* being used to poke fun at better-off township dwellers.
comes from the derisory terms that can be aimed at *amaModelCs*—those schooled at former white schools.

Moreover, overt and covert prestige is connected to forms of income generation in ways that do not always favor the former. Growing up in Umlazi, and with a father who was a former principal of an Umlazi school, one graduate of a prestigious upper Berea school noted the advantages of his accent and the networks his school opened to him for finding work. He recalled an interview he had at a business where the (white) employer noticed that he had attended another of Durban’s rugby playing schools and started talking about rugby, immediately relaxing the atmosphere; he got the job. Yet he also suggested that graduates of former white schools are rarely employed in the government, where former anti-apartheid activists (denied the opportunity of white schools) can be employed at higher positions and feel “intimidated” by his accent. What is needed to attain this work, he said, is membership of the ruling ANC party and “comrade speak.”

Endpoints: Schooling and geographies of prestige

In July 2012, the KwaZulu-Natal Education Department controversially announced an end to zoning, whereby children from a school’s local area are given priority in admissions. It argued that this policy was used by schools located in former white suburbs to exclude black students; opponents in turn challenged the legality of this move and argued that admitting poor township students would bankrupt former white schools. Both views, as this analysis has suggested, are grossly over-simplistic portraits of the geography of schooling. In fact, schools are significantly differentiated within former racially defined areas—townships as much as white areas—and schools and parents have long developed sophisticated spatial strategies to shape admissions. Moreover, as racial segregation ended, all schools became linked in a systemic process through the movement up the schooling hierarchies of children, fees, and cultural capital (e.g., parents’ support for a school), thereby working to increase the gap between public schools despite government efforts at redistribution. Private schools sit at the top of this hierarchy, and there has been an expansion of these schools, including efforts to cater to parents who cannot afford the fees of the older, more established private schools.
One destructive consequence of these circuits of schooling is the massive diversion of resources away from classroom teaching. Parents spend large amounts of money on travel costs, schools’ resources are channeled into marketing and bursaries, and of course a huge amount of children’s time is spent travelling. Rural schools, we must not forget, were favored until quite recently by both missionaries and the early apartheid government, yet they today they frequently reproduce not only the economic but symbolic marginalization of rural areas, including the provision of limited access to English. The designation of many rural schools as “no-fee” institutions might have lightened the burden of some guardians, but it has arguably done little to counteract the pressures that have increased educational inequalities. Indeed, Umlazi and notably Wentworth (where there is a brisk market in boarding accommodation for children from the Eastern Cape) contain a significant number of rural-born people who move to the city to access better education, thereby diverting resources that could be invested in rural schools.

As noted, the migration of high income (predominantly white) residents out of central Durban to west and north Durban bears some similarity to (north-south) divisions in Johannesburg (Selzer and Heller 2010). Here, the spatial politics rests on an upper middle-class isolating itself from the rest of the city in part through investing in excellent schools. Yet unlike the U.S.’s “edge cities,” white residents are unable (and perhaps in some cases unwilling) to fully insulate themselves from a growing black middle class (Crankshaw 2008). What is peculiar to Durban, however, is the continued prestige of central Durban’s old schools that creates a center of gravity toward the downtown area not seen in Johannesburg or U.S. cities. How long this will last is an important question for the future of the city.

Command over space is a fundamental source of social power and, as I have argued, key to how schooling geographies unfold. Many poor and immobile children are excluded from quality schooling—left behind both literally and figuratively; however, for others, the movement from a rural area to township, within a township, from a township to a multiracial school, or from a lower to higher class white area enables potential intergenerational class mobility. Indeed, despite obvious government failures in education, it is a fact that most young South Africans are attaining better schooling than their parents. But—and this is a big but—in the context of economic policies aimed mainly at deracializing privilege after apartheid, the devaluation of qualifications that accompanies any expansion in schooling is experienced not as an educational issue, but in the huge competition that exists for limited jobs. Education has always been a way
to divide groups into social hierarchies as much as to provide learners with skills, but the current employment crisis makes these battles more intense; anyone doubting this might talk to one of the many relatively well-educated and thus employable Zimbabwean immigrants who now crowd into rented houses on the Bluff to avoid xenophobia in local townships and informal settlements. Struggles over education are intimately tied to the social production of space in South Africa and vice versa. Such contestations are not only simultaneously social and spatial in nature, but also material and symbolic.

Bibliography


(Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 21), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 171 – 208.


