Trusting public? Preliminary thoughts on urban seclusion, trust and public space

Very first draft. Do not share or cite

Talja Blokland

talja.blokland@hu-berlin.de

Thank you for the opportunity to share this very first draft of an introduction and a book chapter with you. It is much more in a preliminary stage than I would wish, so I ask you to not distribute or quote this! Also, I apologize for the length and the lack in structure of especially the section on theories of trust, but given your expertise, it is exactly the topic of trust where I hope to learn from you most! I have indicates at a few points where you may skip or what I have deleted text to give you less work. If you have very little time or no interest in "the urban", can I ask you to please focus om the introduction and section 5 and the conclusion in chapter 2?

Chapter 1

The decline of rubbing shoulders and why it matters

1 Introduction

In the last three generations, the spatial radius of our everyday routines has changed tremendously. In this time of increased digitalization, I can conduct my mundane routines in a decreasingly *smaller* spatial radius than my grandmother did. Fewer chores force me to leave home than they brought my grandmother outside. She combined raising two children with a full-time job as a domestic worker, by herself in the center of Amsterdam, the Netherlands in the 1940s, and for everything she did, she would leave the small apartment in *De Pijp*, then a low-income working-class neighborhood. While she was hardly home in those years, she did not travel often or far beyond the district if it was not for work. She was an immigrant from Austria after World War I, who only once in her life traveled back. My mother raised me and my sisters in a small suburban town in the South of the Netherlands. We spent more time with my mother in our house than my mother did with hers. Except for some vacations in the family car, a trip to the shopping mall of a city forty kilometers away was something to look forward to. The family life that my mother built with us as we played with our toys, baked cookies and learnt about the world through the twenty-four volumes of an encyclopedia that my parents had subscribed to, was more domestic than her own childhood. There had been no place inside for play, and globally, this is a family reality for many. When I raised my children, I urged them to bring their teenage friends into our house on Friday nights, because I preferred the idea that they would drink their first beers on my sofa instead of somewhere in an empty parking lot or a park. When a young man, who had bothered some girls with whom my sons spent an evening drinking in a park in Berlin years, later put a gun to my son's head, he was grown enough to be smart and walked away unharmed. I felt irritation that the girls had been outside, whereas they could have had the party in the house (and that the *girls* had been too drunk to realize that they were running into trouble, confirming to our gender stereotypes). They did not have had to be outside, after all! Class mobility has affected the spatial radius of our three generations, and with the aspirations of middle-class life realized, so did the reduction of our spatial radius, as the relative

proportion of my role repertory that I spent away from home. During the Covid19 pandemic, we have seen a global increase in middle-class people leaving their houses *less*, and research shows that their routines have not bounced back entirely. People who lived in small spaces in Berlin, Germany, more often reported that the pandemic made them depressed if they had juggled their life in a small city with using the urban amenities intensely.[1] In cities where street life and work is highly segregated by social class, the use of public streets and squares continued in areas where people could not hide inside. It did during the pandemic in Latin Americans' popular neighborhoods, where staying at home was never an option and depending on the city, their government failed to tailor containment measurements to their life situations.[2]

At the same time, the spatial radius of my role repertory covers way *more* miles than did those of my ancestors. When I boarded a plane to a graduate student conference years ago, I must have been the first in my family to fly. I do very different things than my grandmother did, who was a domestic worker, or my mother, who had to be a full-time mother and later was a substitute teacher in our local school. I have traveled many more distances and met far more people than these generations did. As Hardin (2006) notes, people encounter many more people nowadays than in previous times, a process accelerated first by industrial capitalism and then by digital capitalism. The affluent among us have the privilege to travel the globe and engage in new contexts if they wish: by car, plane or train, always insulated from those who cannot afford this mobility. Stuck overnight in Heathrow Airport one day with a surgeon from Sao Paulo on his way to Warsaw to teach Polish surgeons some special operation technique, the taxi to return us to the airport did not show up. I suggested taking the tube. The surgeon filmed his two-station tube journey to send it to his children, because he had never taken a subway before. I asked him how many cars he owned, and he replied without a blink 'five' and enthusiastically talked about their brands. He and I could move through an "assemblage of islands", as Bauman (2017:101) called it: "moving freely and, if necessary, out of reach of others to abdicate from one's responsibility, is the central feature of power in our time" (Bauman 2017:21 citing Mutschler 2016). Some may argue that historically, colonial cities have "always" worked in this way, but I am not sure that is exactly accurate. Automobility and other technological devices have altered our spatial radius and the ways in which we move, and digitalization is now doing so, too. How we relate to each other in urban space in our fluid encounters as we go about our daily business may hence also change. This book discusses if and how we can think of public spaces in our contemporary urban lives as sites where we develop practices of trusting and caring or, instead, distrusting and uncaring. It argues that digitalization enhances processes of seclusion that reduce the publicness of urban life. Seclusion, I will argue, increases the potential of urban violence and contributes to our failing to produce democratic and just cities. To live our urban lives differently, we need to start to engage more critically with digitalization and other efficient but individualized ways of getting things, and move away from its technological bluff, to use a term of Jacques Ellul (1990).

Writing this in Bogotá, how much social distances I travel with the spatial distance that I cover depends on whether I stay in coffee shops of *Quinta Camacho* with its red-brick stylish restaurants and bars or cross to the busyness of formal and informal vendors on 8th avenue, where people meander along stands with leaves and spices to evict the bad and activate the love alternate with folding tables full of plastic-wrapped sneakers praised as 'national copies' rather than international ones, and a cart-turned-into-bike-

---

[1] For the empirical analyses for this claim see: Blokland, T., Vief, R., & Holm, A. (2025) Living small in the big city under lockdown: Urban amenities, housing conditions, and 'feeling depressed because of COVID19′ in Berlin, Germany. *Housing, Theory and Society*, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/14036096.2025.2450380

[2] See for example: Basile P. (2023) Vulnerability, neglect, and collectivity in Brazilian favelas: Surviving the threats of the COVID-19 pandemic and the state's necropolitics. *Urban Studies*, 60(9):1690-1706

repair shop on the busy pavements in front of outlet stores, traditional textile shops, small eateries, electronics stores and others that cater to a low- and middle-income population, a flow of people with various origins and destinies, thrown together thickly. Learning from scholars theorizing from cities of the "South" (Bhan 2019), cities where the majority holds positions of political, economic, spatial and ecological vulnerability (Simone & Pieterse cited in Bahn 2019:643) in urban spaces that result from "peripheral urbanization" (Caldeira cited in Bhan 2019:642) helps me to rethink the taken-for-granted ideas of spatial radius, social distance and public space into which my education and biography socialized me. As soon as darkness falls over downtown Bogotá and Sao Paulo alike, the people hurrying down its packed pavements an hour earlier disappear, the gutters of the shop fronts go down with a rattle, and when everything is locked up, the badly lit streets are for those that live in the night, have no place to go to, or engage in activities best hold in the dark. And the taxi drives through streets with shadows of people on cartons and in entrances of closed buildings, or here and there in small groups, with blankets over their meagre shoulders gesticulating and loud voices echoing against the ghastly dark building facades, dispersed by police raids to clean the cities of their respective *Crackolandia* and *Bronx*. The Sao Paulo driver does not stop at traffic lights. We talked about the upcoming mayor elections, he would vote for Bolsonaro's candidate, because the city needed order and safety, *segurança.* And I wonder: is this still the center of "the city", which, ultimately, is "the people" (Friedmann 2000)?
Digitally, many of us can, in theory, go far without moving our bodies, and connect with anyone if they are also online. I can instantly bring pictures of the world to my mother, who never travelled further than Italy or Spain, so such connectivity allows mediations. But I do as I like. So, while the affluent of this world can choose where to go, they can also choose where to not go, more than they ever could in history and more freely than the rest of the urban world, which is the numeric majority. Digitalization means that our physical selves, our minds with our bodies, enter fewer public sites where they rub shoulders with unknown other citizens and street-level state agents than they *have had to do* in other times. And control over our spatial radius is one dimension of inequality, obviously. When we order online, someone will come and bring our order, and for this person, the platform economy may have entirely different consequences. The young men on their motorbikes who chat to each other and watch their phones nearby an upmarket shopping mall in *Jardim*, a Sao Paulo neighborhood where doormen in uniforms watch over the leafy streets with well-maintained flower beds between wrought iron fences, may have expanded their spatial radius, now that such delivery services have boomed. Or they hand their deliveries in the middle- and upper-class apartment buildings of *Vila Mariana* through a little hatch to the doorman, another facilitator of life in peace and isolation, who will change uniform and neighborhood after his shift and disappears from the view of the affluent on his bike. The tenants put their trash outside of their apartment's service entry doors twice a day and while they may catch a glimpse of the man who walks the stairs with large bags to collect, they do not need to know where their trash goes. 'You do not have to recycle, but it is nice for them if you do', my landlady commented when introducing this system to me when I arrived in one of these apartments in 2024. In Bogota, recycling workers walk the streets of upper-class neighborhoods to search for useable trash in the bags that people or their concierges and housekeepers put out, dragging wooden charts themselves since the success of animal rights concerns has banned horses from the job. One day, my son and I sat on a bench eating a burger on *Bergmannstrasse*, a residentially and commercially gentrified street in Kreuzberg, Berlin, and saw an order of burgers being delivered – by foot, to an apartment in a building three doors down the street. The secure lives of some, including their digital practices, depend on the work of those who deliver, collect, clean and repair, and they keep the city going, as is increasingly recognized in urban studies.

Global North scholars thought of the ghetto as a place of relegation where the poor lived enclosed lives and with the exception of some discussion on global cities as dual cities in the late 1990s, with its ideas too crude to take hold, they have not usually paid as much attention to the interdependencies between

the urban wealthy and the lives of the poor. London has become a city that is "both flourishing and floundering at the same time" (Atkinson 2020:7) as it works for the rich and their capital in their "alphahoods" while "beyond exists a city of poverty, homelessness, revenge evictions, defunded state schools, displacement from gentrification, bedroom taxes on the poor and the perpetually rising rents" (Atkinson 2000:168) but the elites depend on those whom they other for their cleaning, repairing, maintaining, gardening, grooming, delivering, child caring, dog-walking and not in the last place, securing: the urban fabric is fragmented, but the seclusion of the rich only works when "life below" (Atkinson 2000) continues. Global North historians tended to see grand boulevards and other emblematic public spaces as the areas where historically the rich paraded to see and to be seen by other members of the elite, with attempts to keep out the poor to sanitize their life experience. Such sanitization now aims at the wallets of visitors, tourists visiting pretty towns and cities and gaze at their often nicely renovated facades. A fancy urban restaurant with an open kitchen where customers can see the cook at work or the coffee houses where trained baristas brew a *café especial* with coffee beans that you may choose from a menu, hides who carries the bags of beans inside and who does the dishes. The dirty, ugly, and painful, is effectively kept from view. In Tübingen, a small university town in the South-West of Germany, the city's tourist office advertises its prettiness for photo-selfies. Prague manages to keep its *Staré Mesto* somehow graffiti-free as well as almost devoid of visible poverty: with its picturesque renovations, its boat tours, paddle boats, tower-climbing and curious museums, it has gotten as close to Disneyland as a city center could be, conform to the expectation that cities become sites of culture and capital that Sharon Zukin wrote about. The efforts to police some blocks of the center of Salvador de Bahia by heavy-armed police vehicles, police officers stationed in the first stock of a building overlooking the square so that tourists can stroll around the heritage site and buy souvenirs from registered vendors only build a contrast, but the concept is similar: city governments create pretty 'diversion districts' where diversity can safely be consumed (Judd 2010:266), aimed at visitors and their money, middle class enclaves with visible or invisible walls where some deserve to rub shoulders while others are kept away. Gentrification brings new rhythms and tempos to everyday life: you need to have the time, money and flexibility to enjoy these urban spaces, and "fit with the aesthetics" of the newly organized events to celebrate such sites' authenticity (Kern 2016). While first segregation and gentrification, meanwhile, reduced the socio-economic diversity of urban residential areas, now local community activities and 15-minute city concepts seem on the rise, sometimes motivated by ecological concerns, sometimes by desire for more social cohesion or local activism against neoliberal capitalism. These political economy of the shape of cities have culture lagging behind, if you want: we know that what we expect of our cities changed over time, and that the auto lobby and building industry pushed the suburbanization of the 1950s and 1960s in US American cities, for example, which ran down city centers and that the nostalgia of retro-urbanism that then followed, feeding into an escapism of fantasy urbanism (Ellin 2003) in carefully regenerated downtown Main Streets where we can drink coffee, browse books and bric-a-brack stores that sell things that nobody needs until they saw it and tourists flock the street on a weekend. Such urbanism satisfies consumer needs that are carefully crafted by economic interests. And in the evening, everybody returns back home between gates, lawns and parking garages in the suburban again: the end of a more multi-dimensional urbanism (Rae 2008) is not in sight, and this way of life is easiest to see, but not limited to the super-wealthy of London or New York City. We first created islands along lines of (race and) class and then plead for the neighborhood as basis for community life. Such talk about community has become an effective way to strengthen the inward orientation of our daily routines in homogeneous circles of ties. Cities up to times of industrial capitalism had their segregations and the elites may always have been able to shield themselves off from the poor. Carriages with curtains not only hid upper-class women from the eye of the public but also shut the eyes of the elite for that public, of course. And yet, I used to think of cities as did Ulf Hannerz:

> In whatever terms people are set apart from each other or thrown together according to other principles of organization, those who end up in the city also rub shoulders with each other and catch glimpses of each other in their localized everyday life (Hannerz 1980: 99).

I started my own intellectual journey over 20 years ago with Hannerz and the Chicago School's idea of mosaics of social world. Rubbing shoulders was the consequence of the size, heterogeneity and density, the characteristics that for Louis Wirth described the city. People could live residentially somewhat segregated, but the residential segregation of North- or Latin American cities was, in my thinking, of another level, and honestly at the time, I had enough trouble understanding my own place, Rotterdam, at the time to pay too much attention to mega-cities in Asia or Africa. Up to today, I have never thought about how people rub shoulders in Almaty, with two million residents the largest metropole of Kazachstan, or Yelkatirnburg, a city with almost two million residents in the Ural-Volga region of Russia. My observations are limited by my standpoint. From the Ukranian geographer Olena Kononenko, I have learnt that the Soviet production of space by the state did not produce the density of public space through commerce like shops, cafés and restaurants. Slavutich, a planned city built in two years after the disaster of the nuclear Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant to house the workers and their families, making a small town of about 30.000 residents, far enough to be out of the zone of contamination but close enough to be able to return to work at the plant, has nothing of the functional diversity that we have learnt to value from Jane Jacobs, but its sociability works in other ways, with the kitchens of apartments being more open space for gathering than other parts of the flats. Everyday encounters depended on the workplace and the residential blocks as sites of everyday sociability, and the collective experience of the disaster, the displacement and the loss of jobs that followed created a strong sense of identity through collective memory. Only when newcomers started to settle in the city and the workplace did not make everyone rub shoulders anymore, did residents develop a sense of anonymity and loneliness (Kokonenko & Blokland 2025). The world does not look like Greenwich Village, New York, from where Jane Jacobs wrote, and we must differently about public life. In the Chinese city of Shanghai (Wang et al. 2017), perceptions of trustworthiness of migrants and city dwellers rubbing shoulders in the same residential neighborhoods must be understood through the lens of the stigmatizing *hukou* system that defines urban citizenship entitlements, which demonstrates that we always will have to think about state categorizations' consequences for everyday boundary work in which we engage when we encounter other people. In short: my understanding of the urban world is constrained, and a comparative gesture starts for me with learning how little I know.

That said, in the urban contexts I know well, I observe the rubbing of shoulders in public space while we are on the way doing our everyday routines as taking the ride with *other* urban transformations, and the more attention I pay to this, the clearer I seem to see it happen. Since scholars like Richard Sennett or Lyn Lofland wrote about urbanity and public space, from their Global North standpoints in London and New York and North America more generally, I think we have not thought much about how certain urban transformations influence the public life of our cities, and I think it is time that we do so. When Europeans first learnt about the gated communities of US American and Latin American urban landscape, I believe they thought of it as an odd curiosity. But the Disneyfication continued, so did the privatization of land and buildings, and the industry of securitization that sells an arsenal of stuff to turn your home in a fortress. We have a fair idea about the motivations of individuals to turn to such ways of living and studies of how they function, Scholars have also warned for what they do not do: in the words of Siebel and Wehrheim (2003:11), "walls remind us daily of the danger lurking behind them, but don't make them go away." The gates and walls, in all their forms, interest me in what they do to the rest of the urban landscape. The stories-so-far collected in such places are "articulations of the wider power-geometries of space" (Massey 2005:130) and a "product of (..) intersections within wider settings", but the "non-meetings-up, the disconnections and the relations not established, the exclusions"

(Massey 2005:130) appear to gain importance and require more of our analytical attention. Outside such urban 'niceness' the rest – is just city: the sort of urban landscape that is not pretty or pleasant, and in which nobody with power takes a special interest, other than keep it functioning – in terms of mobility, and thus safety. Outside gentrified neighborhoods, gated communities, suburban enclaves and other 'bubbles' where Jane Jacobs ideal of walkable neighborhoods full of functional diversity 'works,' safety is an increasing concern, and a brutalization of urban life has been thematized, often as a problem of public order. The power of mobility "entrenches the spatial mobility of other groups" (Massey 1993:63). After clashes between the police and young people on New Years Eve in 2023 in Berlin, Germany, most people wanted to celebrate nicely, the mayor claimed, only to see the party spoiled by migrant young men who engage police officers in their firecracker-fights that reminds of the cat and mouse if it was not so deadly dangerous. With little attention to the performance of these events, the stigmatization of an already spoiled identity of urban youth was as predictable in 2025 as it was in the years before: the city would be such a lovely place if it were not for such brutality of *them*. There is something changing about big and excessively big cities, it seems to me, that accelerated by the current digitalization, especially since the pandemic, that requires us to think more carefully about what happens to urban public life. Put briefly, I think that urban public life changes with developments such as secluded living in gentrified condominiums, selective suburbanization, digitalization and platform economy and home office work. Such developments influence whom we rub shoulders with, and how, and with whom we do not. And while this is going on, we see a parallel discussion, also expressed in politics, of what is usually framed as a "decline in trust" on the one hand and an "increase in fear" on the other, about which social commentators and researchers have been concerned now at least since Putnam's influential *Bowling Alone*. As trusting *takes place*, in the sense that it 'happens' and is spatially produced or in other words, is situated in the materiality of specific locations, we may also see it as *place making*, and urban settings are thus well-suited to explore dis/trusting

Doreen Massey, who is often cited as having introduced the idea of throwntogetherness, thought of cities as "open time-space intensities of social relations" (1999:263) to join others in questioning the essential idea of place, and argued for a concept of space that was "open and dynamic", so that we see better that space is constantly "in the process of being made" (Massey 1999:264) "The chance of space," Massey writes in *For Space*, "may set us down next to the unexpected neighbor. The multiplicity and chance of space here in the constitution of place provide (an element) that inevitable contingency which underlies the necessity for the institution of the social and which, at a moment of antagonism, is revealed in particular fractures which pose the question of the political." But the chance of space has become, one may say, the next axis of urban inequalities because this contingency *is evitable* for some, and they are no longer the absolute elites. Practices of selective use of the urban reduce contingency: the circumstances that are possible but cannot be predicted with certainty. We may order things, speak with people on screens, rather than in person or attend lectures online to avoid covering large distances, and an argument in favor of digitalization of events is saving time, costs and environment, and accessibility. My concern is with things we do now online that we did in-person as daily routines, not with a yearly conference, a high-profile university lecture, or a meeting of global business partners. Sometimes digitalization enables me to combine my roles as professor and mother in ways I could not do before. When I decide on a busy day of family duties to not travel into the university but meet with my research team online, then that is unreflective convenience and a way to fit in more work in a too busy schedule. While not at all always intended (and people's intentions do not really fit the field of sociology), secluded living reduces contingency, and the huge inequalities in who gets to do this and how affects the potential for cohesive, just, and democratic cities. This has made me think about the necessity of an urban public life. This book brings those thoughts to paper. A core idea of this book is that urban public life, like all other social life, requires trust mechanisms, so I will try to make sense of the concerns that follow through the lens of dis/trust and un/care. I see two challenges that unsettle the usual sociological

thinking about trust, which I will discuss briefly in the next section, before introducing the structure of this book and a brief note on its methodology.

2 Two challenges

One challenge is that a trusting person is always practicing dis/trust in relations with others, and thus that we need to think carefully about practice and relations, because trust is not something that we 'have' and can decide to 'use'. Trust is thus a feature of relational settings. The other challenge is that trust develops in common all-the-time, everyday situations, especially in public life. This means that urban transformations that affect such public life require us to think more carefully about trust. As trusting *takes place*, in the sense that it 'happens' and that it is spatial or, in other words, is situated in the materiality of the specific location where it is done, we may also see it as *place making*. Pratt (1991:34) sees urban space as a contact zone where "cultures meet, class and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetric relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world." When thus what takes place where undergoes a transformation that digitalization is, something happens to how and where trust happens, and something also happens to the sites where it made places in other times. Something happens to the "throwntogetherness", a concept from the work of the British geographer Doreen Massey that inspired this book:

> "[W]hat is special about place is precisely that throwntogetherness, the unavoidable challenge of negotiating here-and-now (itself drawing on a history and a geography of thens and theres) and a negotiation which must take place within and between both human and non-humans (…) This is the event of place." (Massey 2005:129)

Digitalization is not typical to cities, of course, and one could claim that the world has become a global village (although we will discuss Zygmund Bauman's rejection of this claim later). Or one can say at least that the urban is global, and we have arrived in a time of planetary urbanism, which includes the idea that even hinterlands far remote from cities are organized according to the workings of capital, labor and the production of space in relation to urban centers. There is a busy bus-stop at the highway outside of the town of Codó, Maranao, the poorest state of Brazil, but a piece of land rich in minerals. The nearby railroad tracks only carry metals from the mines, not people. This would not be a hub of bus-lines to main Brazilian cities if people, phones with digital tickets in their hand and in live-chat with other people elsewhere, had enough of wealth and comfort to stay put. The women cooking food to sell to the waiting passengers in big aluminum pots do not tell the story that if it was not the production of aluminum in the region for export to industries serving an urban Global North the land would be less wasted, the water levels would be different, the plants may grow. That is planetary urbanism, and digitalization is not absent at all – but for this small book, I limit myself to think about what is going on *in* cities (and not about 'the urban'), in the everyday understanding of the word. Mobility can be as much an expression of extraction and exploitation as it can be of privilege and affluence which historically built on such extractions and exploitations. Mobility makes cities.

Cities are heterogeneous, dense and large settlements, to cite once more the famous description of Louis Wirth from the 1920s, and we could discuss how they are not 'towns', or where the cut-off point may be between towns and cities or where the city 'ends' – where geographers have argued that the urban is planetary. While many of us live in towns or ordinary cities, rather than metropoles, my lens has a big-city bias, as I have mostly lived in and thought about cities and metropolitan regions with close to a million residents. This big-city bias is a sharp lens to think about the workings of throwntogetherness. It would be another project to think about questions of dis/trust and un/care from small towns, where talk of the town does symbolic boundary work and in- and outsider mechanisms have localized

dimensions. I aim to theorize trust not in an abstract matter removed from the everyday contexts of urban life, but to think about it from the urban fabric produced 'everyday'. This is rarely done: we will see that there is a large literature on theories of trust, but a lot of work is statistical, experimental or theoretical. Where trust is relevant in urban empirical work, its theorizing in turn is a little flat.

To approach trust as developing in in practices of everyday life means that we must capture a process, which has never been of central interests of social theorists, and empirical urban studies on the other hand skate over a not very clear surface using an undertheorized use of the word 'trust.' They thus often end up writing about something social that feels warm and nice, that are good ways of urban life, with pleas for more of it, but do not always help us to step up to deeper analytical understanding of the social fabric of the city. I work, as we will see in more detail in Chapter 2, with the idea that trust is not an independent act of a person as a 'self-propelling essence', in Charles Tilly's words.[3] For relational sociologist Charles Tilly, the humanistic approach slides easily into thinking that experiences affect individual consciousness, so that shared meanings of places are "individual mental realities multiplied" (Tilly 1998a:497; see also Tilly 2000) or mentalism (Tilly 1998b). Naturally, people tell stories about themselves and others in this way. We have come to believe "in a world full of continuous, neatly bounded, self-propelling individuals whose intentions interact with accidents and natural limits to produce all of social life" (Tilly, 1998a, p. 497). However, Tilly continues:

> "…the same humans turn out to be interacting repeatedly with others, renegotiating who they are, adjusting the boundaries they occupy, modifying their actions in rapid response to other people's reactions, selecting among and altering available scripts, improvising new forms of joint action, speaking sentences no one has ever uttered before, yet responding predictably to their locations within webs of social relations they themselves cannot map in detail. They tell stories about themselves and others that facilitate their social interaction rather than laying out verifiable facts about individual lives. They actually live in deeply relational worlds. If social construction occurs, it happens socially, not in isolated recesses of individual minds. (Tilly 1998a:497–498).

A person is not a bound individual with a specific characteristic, that 'has' a certain 'amount' of trust. Nor is it a fully rational agent: although there are many entirely rational theory accounts of trust, they do not fit with our everyday experiences well (Douglas 1986). in *How Institutions Think,* Mary Douglas (1986:7) argued that "whitling down the meaning of self-serving behavior until every possible disinterested motive is included merely makes the theory vacuous." I follow her suggestion to keep the Durkheimian idea that individual thought has its social origins:

> "Classifications, logical operations, and guiding metaphors are given to the individual by society. Above all, the sense of a prior rightness of some ideas and the nonsensicality of others are handed out as part of the social environment." (1986:10)

Although Durkheimian thinking has lost popularity and "the very idea of a supra-personal cognitive system stirs a deep sense of outrage" (1986:x) as it easily sounds reactionary and conservative to think about how our minds are socially influenced, and like Merton, Douglas does not want to suggest that this is the case – but she does stimulates us to continue thinking about the collective as something different than an aggregate of individual attitudes and opinions that we happened to have, and happened to be socialized in by the individuals that raised us in dyadic relationships – and as I have argued in similar vein in relation to the idea of community, we should overcome the nervousness that comes for

[3] The next paragraph is copied from an earlier paper: Blokland (2012).

social scientists of analyzing community or, as Douglas notes, social bonds, because as an everyday idea, it *matters* – as do trust, care and solidarity.

Trust, as we will see in chapter two more extensively, is relational – it can only happen between people and never within them – and it thus follows that it requires encounters between people. People with whom we have absolutely nothing to do are not people we trust or distrust, but at best, if someone forced us to think about them, which we may never do when we have nothing to do with them, we may mistrust. I saw a snapshot on CNN news on a January morning of a row of men, covering their faces, who walked over the landing strip of an airport away from a plane which appeared to have just landed. The US government had deported the men to Ecuador as part of Trump's first decreets after his inauguration. Trump's campaign may have been successful in unlashing fear, and in convincing US Americans that they should distrust, if not despise, their immigrant neighbors now, as each one of them could be an illegal criminal (or even eat their cats?), while ignoring all the empirical evidence that this is nonsense. When I watched the news, I was far enough of the situation to not have a judgement at all on whether these men ought to be distrusted, all I did was watch with, at most, no idea at all: they could have been out there to hurt others, but they may as well not hurt or ever have hurt anyone. When I heard that the Israeli government had released Palestinian prisoners as part of the deal in the ceasefire, and the journalist said that they included criminals sentenced for life, I caught myself thinking that we may have enough reason to lack confidence in the fairness of the military trials that convict Palestinians who do get a trial so that I mistrusted the accurateness of what I heard, but again, I was far enough from the situation to have the luxury of *not having to* either trust or distrust, as *not caring* remained for me without consequences. What I mean, in short, is that whether we trust and distrust belongs to relational settings where interactions between agents happen. They may be only medialized and not directly interpersonal, but dis/trusting events contrast to moments of unclarity and lack of transparency, or of great distance, where all we have, at most, is mistrust. To mistrust is close to what I think of as un-care, an idea that I will develop later in more depth. This reflects Ahmed's (2000) idea that we construct the stranger only in the moment of her entry, which in turn adapts Simmel's (1905) work on the stranger. But, as we will see, it is a critique of the very common idea in urban studies that when we move through the city, we act *blasé* as we are unable to absorb all the impressions of the business of urban life.

Continuous urban transformation must have implications for trust to the extent that trust is constitutive for the urban fabric. This connects this book to my earlier work on social capital in the city. I have spent a good deal of time thinking about how the urban fabric holds resources which citizens can use to realize their individual and collective capabilities. Much of such access depended on the brokery of other people: people in our own social networks, whom we know we can turn, but also people who open doors for us in much more casual, unexpected ways. Another aspect of the urban fabric for me has always been the collective question of what it means to be citizens together, and how fragmentation of understandings of urban citizenship claims, while legitimate, may hamper our collective capacity to get things done.

Both these topics find their reflection in social capital literature. As there are many excellent overviews of the social capital literature, I highlight three elements from early contributors. *Note to reader: I have removed this discussion of Coleman and Bourdieu to shorten the text.*

From Putnam's social capital contributions, I obviously take the insight that trust is an inherent element of social capital as a feature of the social fabric of our cities: I have discussed this in other places as the public life of social capital. The other idea in Putnam's work that continues to inspire me is the idea that social capital is a by-effect of people doing other things: in Putnam's *Bowling Alone*, John and Lombert both played in a bowling league. John donated Lombert a kidney. A retired hospital worker received a kidney from an accountant: "he *casually learnt* about Lombert's need, and unexpectedly approached

him," Putnam wrote (REF). The infrastructure of people doing things while learning about other, unintended things that is compacted in this example is an undervalued element of social capital discussions – and difficult to categorize, operationalize and measure which may the lack of attention. However, what other than the kindness of John's heart makes us act in such a situation? If places are collections of stories and articulations of wider power geometries of space, as Doreen Massey wrote, what sort of places are inducive for this to happen? John needs to *care* on some sort of level about Lombert to do as he did. As this caring seemed to have been not entirely personal – John and Lombert had not been close friends and may never have socialized outside of the bowling league – why would John do such a thing? Should we just assume that he happened to be a good person, and that when we see people express hate rather than care, that goodness disappeared? Or should we have a closer look at how do we develop such practices of caring in urban public space, and can we also un-care, in the sense of having our care disappear? And what is the relation between such care practices, a new championed idea in contemporary urban studies, and trust as social mechanism? Is trust a necessary mechanism for care practices to become common? I will leave the social capital debate for what it is in the rest of this book, that focusses instead of the question, how we may think about the workings of trust and distrust as social mechanisms that help us to understand the social fabric of our cities.

The risk of posing such questions is what we may call the trap of neighborhood conviviality. Much of the ideas on social capital, both in terms of getting by and getting ahead and in collective efficacy, have developed on the level of neighborhoods as people's immediate area of residence, even though many of us spend a good deal of our time either in our homes shielded off from our neighbors or out and about doing things outside of our neighborhoods. Maybe we could even go as far as suggesting that neighborhoods are not the most interesting sites of studying the urban anymore as gentrification and segregation make them more and more into lifestyle enclaves. As urban scholars, we have also focused on neighborhoods because it is methodologically easier than other urban settings. I wonder sometimes whether this approach prioritizes conviviality and community over fear and violence. With a governmentality of fear gaining in strength and a political time in which the boundary work towards others reaches new levels of denigration and disrespect in cities which I have studied (especially Berlin and Rotterdam), the production of fear forms a legitimizing frame for state violence towards specific populations, in policy reality or in the plans of growing right-wing parties (but in the case of Germany, also in CDU and CSU). Yet we write about diversity, conviviality, community, social capital and collective efficacy or urban social movements, neighborhood organizing and activism as if violence is an outside phenomenon coming either from thugs who are not thought of as part of neighborhood 'residents' (and thus have their place only in criminology) or who do their things – crime and violence – only in a public space that is void of the encounters that we associate with these terms, as if crime and violence happen simultaneously without being part of the same place-making processes. I add myself to the list of people who have not thought much about violence and hate, the mechanism that holds hierarchies of identities in place (Schweppe & Perry 2022:504), when writing about the urban fabric. We don't have to look hard to suggest that this may have to change. This book will try to do this, through ideas on dynamics of un-caring and dis-trusting.

3 The structure of this book

*Note to reader: I have removed this, and will sketch in my introduction where I am going but you do not *need* this section for what follows.*

4 A brief note on my methodology (possibly appendix)

Note to reader: I have deleted a note on methodology to shorten.

Chapter 2

Public Life, Fluid Encounters and Theories of Trust

1 Introduction

Both that the claim that public space matters and that we are losing public space to privatization has been extensively analyzed and critically discussed by anthropologists, sociologists and geographers. This literature provides excellent insights in how we can think of public life, public space and describe its transitions, but while it claims that public space is good for many things, most of these claims seem to suggest that public space can and should be a nice relational setting, where the people thrown together rub shoulders in convivial relations that are somehow 'good': for urbanity, for dealing with hyper-diversity, for conviviality. And while scholars of conviviality continue to stress that the concept would not be normative or idealizing nice life in cities, the actual output of research papers that, at least in my review, analyzes various dimensions of conviviality in (mostly but not exclusively) European and North American cities tends to focus on positive relations: even when they analyze conflicts, these are smaller disputes among neighbors and practices of racism and discrimination. Neither the literature on public space nor the scholarship on conviviality clarifies very well what social mechanisms contribute to the positive features of public life and conviviality. And there are many such features: the US American anthropologist and environmental psychologist Setha Low has made a life-work out of studying the benefits of public space, and initiated the *Terra Publica*,[4] a curated database on public space that brings together a tremendous amount of work that helps to see that "public spaces are vital for the well-being for urban communities, and that research from different disciplines can help us understand how to create and manage public spaces better." The multidisciplinary number of papers collected and organized here is both impressive and overwhelming, but also shows what we may be paying more attention to: a relatively black box as to *how* it is that the individual attitudes of persons on the micro-level or structuring processes such as land value extraction and other mechanism of neoliberalism and capitalism, are connected in urban practice. I mean by this that on the one hand, scholars on public space seem to explain its transformations as a result of such large processes that then work out on the individual level, as in a very widely cited article of Don Mitchell (1995), writing on Los Angels, USA, on the heightened control of public space as consequence of neoliberal city planning to the interests of investors that limits the citizenship rights of the homeless. Such work still leaves me wondering why other citizens, those with lives that stand in opposite to what we usually think of as 'disorder', or may be just those with dominant positions in terms of class, race and gender, would simply incorporate the logics of neoliberal thinking about cities and step back from public space. On the other hand, work that discusses interactions between citizens and their communities as urban practice through which they shape their public life, or work that discusses how the design or materiality of squares, plazza's, streets and parks affect how people feel about places and do certain things but not others does not quite satisfy, either, as eventually everything seems to depend on how they happen to interact, and especially the symbolic interactionist tradition and more recently the study of super-diversity, encounters and conviviality produced a long list of case-studies that look at this, with a lot of smaller theoretical notions as every paper needs an original contribution to get through the review process, but when we start reading all this work, we may quickly see that it is a lot of quite similar work: we went to a place, watched what people

[4] https://terrapublica.org/explore/2668#keykoncept-2668

did and asked them about their feelings and their sense of belonging, and wrote about the workings of a public space. But there are intermediate processes here between the overall logic of capitalism and investment and the money-making in our cities, it seems to me, and the personal decision: do I go for a run in this park or for a walk in these streets, or is it better not to? This chapter defines how I will use public space and public life as concepts in the rest of this book to approach this issue, and then shows that mechanisms of dis/trust and un/care can help bridge this gap, and, where scholars have addressed sociability in less theoretical ways, synthesize some of this growing case-study descriptions.

2 Public life[5]

Note to reader: I have removed the discussion of the literature to reduce the size of the text, here is what I conclude

…..

When I speak of public space, I thus follow the definition of public space as all areas that are openly accessible to the public, even if this may not work in practice, because they are governed by trespassing rules, locks on the gates of the park at night, or strong policing of civility laws. I thus follow what Neal calls 'the social definition' of public space as 'where we live our public lives', knowing that the family who lives on the pavement outside of the park in Delhi where the joggers have a free running path thanks to the policing of the uses inside, live their private life in public. When I speak of public life, I mean the partial engagement with the world around us when we happen to rub shoulders on our way to someplace else, which usually takes the form of fluid encounters, or engage with things we do to organize resources outside of the spheres of the 'house' (yes, another concept we can contest) and the workplace of factories, offices and workshops.

Public life may generate familiarity. Less heavily frequently urban spaces may generate these more easily than very busy places, but repeated use of the same routes will create a public familiarity with the built environment as well as with its variety of other regular users, especially users who have been described as familiar strangers by Milgram (1997), or public figures by Lyn Lofland (1986). The seller of candy, singly cigarettes and sodas at the bus terminal is a public figure, so is the baker who knows which rolls my friend Vojin wants to buy before he enters, or the man playing his guitar and appealing to the commuters on the subway line 1 to laugh more in their lives. We learn to place them fast when our routines take us along the same routes: on my 5K run in Johannesburg when I stayed in a guesthouse in an upper class neighborhood only a week, first comes the guard in a yellow vest on his plastic chair outside of a little shed, then the two women in flower dresses everyday chatting at the exact same spot, with another security guard in another of these and on my way back have moved to the large iron gate of a mansion where they talk to a third woman who attends to a dog. Then I meet a man and another man, and one more man, all walking with the 'I-am-going-somewhere' walk, friendly greetings are exchanged, before I pass a jogger, a white tall man with earphones who never greets, a man walking a dog, a woman walking a dog who crosses the street to avoid that her dog meets my running legs and greets as well, and the woman with the little girl with a backpack walking to school. In this highly secured neighborhood where cars get out of iron-sheeted gates and walls around the properties have electric wires, I run for a week to learn first, how quickly familiarity develops when there is low pedestrian use and routinized working life, and second, that my first impression that there was 'no public life' on the few blocks of streets that I went up and down was, once more, too quickly said from the outside looking in. The attempt to fit the social world into categories is always an *Abbildung* (Weber REF), as the urban world "does not impinge on us as a set of discrete variables, but as a vibrant,

[5] This section draws directly from my earlier chapter 'The Public Life of Social Capital' FULL REF

continuous stream of events" (Milgram 1997: xix). And all that said, I acknowledge that the possibilities to do these things freely are unequal, and that the politics of racialized capitalism limit who can and who cannot – and that state-backed violence removes people from streets to create the 15-minute walkable city of enjoyable conviviality for others. The people who walked the streets on my morning runs in that affluent Johannesburg either worked for the rich or were on their ways to do so. But while this empirical reality needs to be thought about, we also do other things – and Honneth writes about this in his discussion of Hegel, when he points out that intersubjective encounters are "strictly reciprocal": "in the encounter between two subjects, a new sphere of action is opened in the sense that both sides are compelled to restrict their self-seeking drives as soon as they encounter each other. Unlike the act of satisfying needs, in which living reality ultimately remains unchanged, in the process of interaction both subjects undergo a transformation. Ego and alter ego react to each other by restricting or negating their own respective, egocentric desires; they can then encounter each other without having the purpose of mere consumption" (Honneth 2012:15).

3 Fluid encounters

Fluid encounters always take the form of at least interdependences, a concept that I used when I was initially inspired here by Norbert Elias (1987:85) and Georg Simmel (1950), whom one could both read as saying that in whatever we do as social beings, we are always interdependent with others. The robber needs a victim to act, and the beggar a person with money to ask for it and the lunatic, if you want, may need to see other people for screaming at them. In the center of Sao Paulo, people have accustomed to wait for their hired cars, staring at the arrival predictions on the screens of their phones, inside the cinema's entry hall at night and as outside in the pavement all these events occur, I induce that they do so to avoid these, but even this is an interdependency. They are avoiding fluid encounters with others than those with whom they just watched a film. "To read a body as 'not agreeable' presupposes contact in a certain way – and that includes not only the subject but also its history" (Ahmed 2004:31). Always returning to lessons I learnt as a graduate student in the classes of Charles Tilly, I follow his idea that the "stuff" of social processes needs to be understood as resulting from interpersonal transactions (Tilly 2005:6). Social scientists write about relationships as if we can see them, but we really cannot: all that we can see or talk about with them are the transactional practices which "create memories, shared understandings, recognizable routines" (Tilly 2005:7) and "endow social sites, including persons, groups and social ties, with information, codes, resources and energies that shape the participation of those sites in subsequent transactions" (Tilly 2005:15, see also Blokland 2017:PAGE).

I will thus think and write about two relational settings. First, I think about fluid encounters of citizens, understood as residents of the city (independent of their formal citizenship status as the laws of the national states that they reside in define it) with other citizens in the public spaces of our cities. We will spend the rest of this section discussing the notion of 'public space' that I use here, Second, I will write about the fluid encounters of citizens with institutional agents, street-level representatives of large organizations in public life that citizens interact with: although the boundary is artificial, I do not include the field of the market and extend the field of the state by sneaking in actors that are not exactly public, such as social workers, teaches and doctors: they still, in my understanding, are the connectors of people to resources that belong to their human rights of safety, health and education, and as safety, health and education are not only personal, but also societal beneficial goods, even when they are not always provided by state agents, they still have a dimension that make them public goods. Moreover, when we think of trust only as an interpersonal matter in citizen-citizen relations, we ignore too much of what constitutes our urban experience. Although survey research may ask very general questions about whether people 'have' trust in certain state agents – and I have done so too in my own survey work –

Möllering (200:355) has pointed out that “actors interpret and question institutions and do not merely reproduce them passively” as “institutions become an object of trust for the trustors who exercise agency in relying on them (or not).”
The public familiarity that fluid encounters may generate does not mean that we do not draw boundaries, but helps us not feeling lost, and, as Felder (2021:181) expanded, may allow us to not pay attention to what is going on around s, because we have superficial knowledge of our environment that is enough of a ‘practical sense of place’ that allows us to just go about our daily routines. For the constitution of our own identities, a constant process (Jenkins 1996), our gathering of information that helps us situate ourselves and others and define whether we identify or not (Lemert 1990?), is casual and not the product of Weberian socially oriented action. In a store, we may overhear conversations of what customers tell a salesperson, although it was not for our ears. On the subway, in a café, in a doctor’s waiting room, the hall of a school building or a shopping centre we watch others, we learn about them through what we are overhearing, and categorize them (Lofland 1985).[6] Every encounter with difference in a super-diverse society provides a chance for boundary work and the re-affirmation of one’s own identity in at least a categorical way. Against insecurity, the familiarity of ‘place’ is often juxtaposed as “source of stability and unproblematic identity” (Massey 1993:63) and the debates on superdiversity and difference often contain reminiscences of such an understanding of the best places as those where we are rooted, as if we were trees that hate to be moved to do well rather than nomads who learn by experience, and rootedness easily becomes reactionary (see also Massey 1993:64, argued in more detail in Blokland 2017). There is thus a tension in the openness of urban public life and the possibility of seeing things differently and the “confident expectation of a favourable outcome of insecure prospective encounters” (Lascaux 2008:1) if we are not already associated with the human beings we encounter. However, very limited amounts of information in fluid encounters give us little to interpret performances and give them meaning in than rather stereotypical ways (making us agents the subtle reproduction of unequal positions). Once we have figured out how the settings where our routines take us work, and what they expect from us, Felder argues, we do not expand our knowledge of the others whom we encounter there further: “what is familiar is not what we do not *yet* know well, but rather what we know well enough so we no longer pay much attention to it, thus *preventing* us from getting to know it better” (Felder 2021:184, my italics), as we experience certain places not just repeatedly, but also, Felder adds, in a particular way “to the point where we take the experience for granted.” I like his point because it helps us see how threats to such familiarity of certain ways may start to play a role for distrusting, whereas the regularity of the experience also helps us to think about uncaring, and both these ideas will return later in this book. There is always going to be uncertainty, and the anticipated future of what will happen next in our urban life in public is always an imagination, in which we draw on our knowledge – and our ignorance (see Survillan & Tuana 2016). Trust must be an illusion, in Lascaux view because while we usually project what we know into the future, we do not have a guarantee that this knowledge is more than a “hint” at the possibility of trust (Lascaux 2018:4). Felder acknowledges as an aside that his thinking risks an epistemic reproduction of dominant positions, as “familiarity is made easier for individuals who navigate through places that have been shaped for them by historical processes” (Felder 2021:189) and I think we will have to address this a little more exhaustively. It may be more than just a little more effort to avoid epistemic ignorance that is needed here. We may need to think of public space itself as the site of the production of exclusionary processes and violence *inside of* situations that qualify as familiar. In other words: this book is an attempt to move my own work away from the niceness of urban life that sometimes seeps into our thinking on public familiarity.

[6] Of course, when we swipe through endless representations of selves on our phones, we also pick up things, but while these matter for personal identifications, their relation to our spatial practices is complex.

I wrote earlier: "More frequent interactions are no guarantee for good relationships (…) but allow us to make more refined differentiations. These are not better forms of boundary work when it comes to the social consequences of the boundaries. But they are different forms. When fluid encounters do not repeat (…) we have little else than superficial observations in interdependencies, incidents and from the media transmitted generalities to position others socially towards ourselves" (2017:FIND PAGE). But what I had to say about trust when writing this was reasoned from the standpoint of an individual, privileged agent. I assumed that public familiarity would give us a sense of situational normalcy, which in turn would evoke trust, as Misztal (2001) had suggested. I also followed Sztompka's idea that trust depends on risks and the assessment of risks and expectations of the behaviour of others (*expected* conduct, Sztompka 1999:53) and that on the basis of instrumental expectations of others, based on regularity, reasonability and efficiency, we can smoothly move through our social worlds (Sztompka 1999:53). While this may not be untrue from the standpoint of the individual agent privileged in a context where his existential security is guaranteed, I do not think that this notion of trust is precise enough, and I think that to understand the consequences of urban transformations on throwntogetherness and thus on the mechanisms of dis/trust and un/care that are packed into this concept, it is not sufficient to reflect only on how I or you or anyone else navigate our lives. Conceptual work on encounters and on conviviality may both be helpful to re-think the rather individualistic orientation that public familiarity got, although I intended it differently. The next sections will therefore bring together some ideas from this literature and point to the challenges that it brings. In the rest of this chapter, I will discuss key debates around the concept of trust, its role for social capital and collective efficacy, belonging and conviviality and the inadequate connection between the usual measurements of trust and theories of trust.

4 Conviviality and encounters

Note to reader: I have removed this section to shorten the text. It argues that urban studies tend to reduce the relevance of non-civil behavior as an outside threat to conviviality. Overall, a lot of urban studies conviviality only locate citizens in neighborhoods and omit thugs (I am using this casually for now, but will return to why and what it means later), as full urban citizens in the urban fabric, and leave the study of these agents to other parts of the field of urban studies and criminology.

5 Theorizing trust

Note to reader: this section "rambles" because it has not had the revisions that you deserve! I apologize for having you read through it, but for a circle of specialists in trust, I wanted to share it with you to see if I am missing important thinking / thinkers here. I would very much appreciate your comments! Especially: What do I miss? What writers are absent that should be there? And with regard to the conclusion, where do you think I "detour" too much? And also: where do I write strongly from my own positionality without reflexivity?

Scholars who write on interactions in public space, especially on the neighborhood level, can be roughly grouped around three central themes: social capital and collective efficacy, conviviality, and encounters and moral geographies. Each of these sets of literature makes assumptions about trust, but as we will see, they do not include much discussion of how, exactly, they theorize what trust is. They therefore share two conceptual challenges, as noted in the introduction. The first challenge is that a trusting person is always practicing dis/trust in relations with others, and trust is not an individual property (Lewis & Weigert 1985). The second challenge is that trust develops in everyday situations in public life, and we must somehow capture this process without reduction of everything to what happens when two people meet, or symbolic interactionism, as that will never get us to understand the urban fabric differently than as a simply aggregate of all such micro-interactions.

Three simple but good ideas of trust to start with are, first, that when you say that you trust me, you

believe that I have the right intentions toward you and that I am competent to do what you trust me to do (Hardin 2006:17), so that, in contrast to betting on a horse (Bachmann 1998:301), there are always more than one person involved and whatever it is, it is not simply a gamble. Second, trusting does not have to happen in every situation in which we deal with others, nor is it immediately 'a problem' when it does not (Barbalet 2019:26). Obligations, for example, have long been a much more central element in social ties and continue to matter a lot in our strongest ties, bringing some authors to remark that trust is "a reactive attitude to late modernity" (Barbalet 2019:26) – I disagree with this because I do not think trust is an "attitude" at all, but the point that we should not overplay its relevance is an important caution (even when one writes an entire book on why it *matters*). Third, it requires, as Bachmann summarized after Giddens (Bachmann 1998:300), the "right combination" of knowledge, resources and norms in a relational setting for such a setting to be "a circle of cooperation" or a "circle of distrust" and this means that trust is not only a mechanism that helps two people coordinate their actions, but also works on other, more collective scales. The idea of circles will help us move later from thinking of trust as something between you and me to a feature of an urban fabric. This means that trust is "placed in a familiar world by symbolic representations and therefore remains sensitive to symbolic events which may suddenly destroy the basis of [trust and confidence]" (Luhmann 2000:97).
Hardin summaries three ideas from the literature that define what 'right intentions' can mean: 'encapsulated interests', 'moral commitments', and 'psychological characteristics.' He is convinced that the study of trust benefits most from the explanation of encapsulated interest, which is the idea that you can trust me because I am interested in gaining or keeping your trust as we can continue our relation, and I am therefore willing to see your interest as my own (or we could also happen to have the same interests, in which case trust is a coincidence) (2006:17). The core element that keeps all motives for you to trust me together for Hardin is the "desire for the relationship to continue – for whatever reason" but it has to draw on the expectations that I value your well-being or (also) my reputation in the eyes of others of my dealings with other people strongly enough to be trustworthy to you. As you need to have good reasons to know that I will do so, trust for Hardin is knowledge-based and open for mistakes. Hardin does not care much what my motives are; whether my trustworthiness is a moral idea or simply my belief that when I let you trust me, other beneficial opportunities follow for me "that would not be open to an evidently untrustworthy person" does not make a difference for how well you can trust me (Hardin 2006:33): trust may depend on knowledge, but it is a relational action. Hardin thinks about trust differently than Pjotr Sztompka, whose work on trust got me interested in the topic a few years ago. He stresses that trusting makes vulnerable. Instrumental trust based on rational expectations is less vulnerable, Sztompka writes (1999: 53), than trust that depends on the moral performances of others. Such trust, he continues, depends on the expectations that others will do the morally right or accepted, are fair and follow such rules with integrity. This is riskier: 'the category of moral agents is certainly narrower than that of rational agents.' We are even more vulnerable when we trust on the basis that people will not be selfish and not put their own interests first, that they will act with the welfare of others in mind, or that they are generous and benevolent (Sztompka 1999: 54). In a liquid society under globalization, to trust in highly diverse, ever changing urban spaces is more of a challenge than it was, and in some places is, in more strictly regulated, less flexible social settings, especially in those were morality was – or is – not a matter of the mind, but given by tradition and, often, religious beliefs. Power relations are implicit in such ideas of 'self-evident' morality.

Sztompka differentiates between trust, distrust and mistrust, and I find this a very useful distinction, as it allows us to think about insecurity and unsafety. Much more than Hardin, Sztompka helps to hang on to the idea of trust as a relational practice, and a social rather than a cognitive mechanism, and to move away from the individual as self-propelling essence (in Charles Tilly's words (1998a)). To think of our social world in relational terms while the accounts we have about the world often come from persons that tell their stories about the world in terms of people intentionally doing certain things remains a methodological challenge for all of us who want to write from a deep commitment to learning from the

everyday world around us, even when in theoretical terms (Hardin, Sztompka and other theorists may not have had this standpoint). The relationality our social life, in which we exist through or interdependencies always means uncertainty, as we can never be quite sure how other people will act: so we take risks (2019:32). The risk idea has produced a tremendous amount of the empirical studies that Hardin saw critically, with models that aim to assess how we deal with risks, and management studies has seen an explosion of such calculations within market logics of costs and benefits. These build on refining work that was already around in the 1950s, with ground-breaking work at the time of political psychologists like Deutsch (1958) who was one of the first to describe trust as something an individual 'has': "an individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event of he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behavior which he perceives to have greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed" (1958:22). This brought the idea into our thinking that trusting is a good thing, and that suspicion means that I expect the consequences of the occurrence of an event to be detrimental to me. He adds that I must be aware of the fact that you seek my trust, and then I must have the responsibility to act according to your expectations, which I may do out of fear of sanctions, or, and here Deutsch levels down to personality characteristics, I have integrity: the strength with which I have internalized "the ability to take goals of another as one's own" (1958:268). Deutsch uses experiments to test various limiting and advancing factors for such psychological traits to flourish, and concludes that trusting is more likely to occur in the experiment's participants behavior if they have a positive orientation to the welfare of others, but even if they do not, they may still be trustful when they *know* what another person will do in their reaction to their action, or when they are well-informed about what will happen if they violate the trust of the other player in the experiment. Later, he found a correlation that participants in the experiment who had higher scores on the F-scale, a scale to, roughly speaking, measure tendencies to support for authoritarianism, and suspicious behavior in trust games (Deutsch 1960). His work attracted a lot of attention and was for example qualified in the same time period by Strickland (1958) who argued that trusting depended on the motivation attributed to the other, and when we perceive the other as benevolent, we will trust. His experiments produced the counter-intuitive findings that chefs who supervised a subordinate closely became less likely to trust them over time. Exploring the difference between cognition and affect as trust motivators among managers decades later, McAllister (1995) found that even for managers "reciprocated care and concern" influenced the likelihood of trust, and that participants in the study relied on "what others think about the dependability" of a colleague – none of this fitting with rationality alone. It is obvious that managerial approaches to making people do what you want, as common in capitalist production, was interested in the further development of such studies, and a whole industry developed, usually drawing on rational choice and game-theory but as McAllister shows, definitely not naively so anymore. But as sociologists know, never reflect what happens in the everyday life of the social world. Lewis and Weigert object to such studies of trust with autonomous rational individuals because "if, as the sociological conception of trust holds, trust is essentially social and normative rather than individual and calculative, we would not expect it to manifest itself strongly in experiments where strangers are brought together to interact in the absence of prior relationships among them (…) Although they speak of trust, these researchers are not really studying trust at all." They investigate what cognitive processes people follow when they formulate and predict what other people will do in a given situation, but "trust begins where prediction ends" (Lewis & Weigert 1985:976).

The tradition of organizational psychology and management studies thus has not produced much that is of use for us here. It is not that there is nothing there. The very idea that trust and suspicion help us think about, for example, how to resolve conflicts and engage in conflict mediation through providing information and expanding knowledge has had great values. Also in smaller points, for example that beyond a dyad of two people who engage in a trust game, a third party matters as it helps the two persons

to think beyond the horizon of their mutual interests and expectations, it remains helpful work. But it is hard to move from Deutsch' experiments out of the dyad of two agents (whether individual or institutional) to more complex configurations. It does not get us to the scale of trust, and violations of trust, in public space, where trust can "circulate" as a "positive affect" that brings people to trust because they see other people do so (Lewis & Weigert 1985:971), and Bachmann. Some authors, such as Barbalet (2019), have insisted on keeping the idea that of a dyadic trust "remains the property of (non-isolated) individuals." Barbalet assumes that trust "operates in terms of dispositions, beliefs or cognitions and feelings or affects and emotions, and these are always properties of individual persons. A person who trusts avoids isolation in the sense that trust is necessarily extended from one person to another" (Barbalet 2019:13), and "only persons as individual actors can provide or reciprocate trust, or be the object of trust" (Barbalet 2019:14) and thus to trust someone means to believe or feel that a person is reliable. The experience of trust in Barbalet's thinking includes a risk as well as a commitment (2019:16). While I do not share the understanding of the individual of Barbalet, I think his work is valuable because we can learn from him that the commitment that emerges once we enter a relationship means that we have a sense of "benign intent" (Barbalet 2019:14) on the other side of the relation. This is congruent with Sztompka's idea that when we trust, we take the risk of making the assumption that others have our interests in their view in a supportive way (see also Lewis & Weigert 1985:969). Once two agents enter a relationship, Barbalet points out that they are to some extent "locked in (…) irrespective of whether there is trust between them" (2019:17). I find this good to think with, because as who rubs shoulders with whom is not in my control at all – different from who I invite into my house, for example – and yet in fluid encounters and durable engagements we encounter others whom we have not chosen (yet) to be friendly with, in the situation of the moment, we are "locked in" in various degrees – it is easier to leave a playground for a mother when she does not like the way the other mothers engage with their children than it is to change schools when she does not like the ideas about child-raising of other parents and connects these situation with a sense that she would rather not "entrust" her child with these other mothers (Blokland 2025). The dimension of access in public space does not only refer to how easily a space can be entered by everyone, but also to the costs of leaving it. The performance and partial involvement of our selves that I have mentioned before is thus related to trust as a feature of relations (and not a personal property) because locked in as the mother is, she may do the emotion work, "the act of trying to change the degree or quality of an emotion" to direct it toward a change in feeling that is more in line with what she thinks is the expected feeling or 'feeling rule' (Hochschild 2003:308). To think of relational settings as varying in how locked we are in the relations we enter helps to see that trust is, ironically in contrast to what Barbalet wrote (2019:14), not a decision as a pivot action, but always a socially constructed reality (Lewis & Weigert 1985:982).

The part of the story that Hardin does not think he needs – how we ascribe normative meanings, whether personal or cultural, to what is "good, right and proper" and conduct relations "subjected to normative regulation" that follows from such meanings is the main interest of Sztompka (2019:32), and constitute thus a moral space. Others, too, have pointed out that not rationality alone, but trust also includes affect and emotions. Hardin suggests that we may simply optimistically or pessimistically trust or not trust. As a political scientist, he does not go further in where such optimism or pessimism may come from then an explanation from developmental psychology that people who grow up happily in families with parents who do all the right and nice things to make them trusting individuals. As for how we become persons that others may trust, he opts to think of the individual as an essence with the property of 'interests' because "where we don't have law, love or convention to be trustworthy, it is often only interest that make us do so" (Hardin 1996:42). I do not find it important to think more deeply about these individual motives because for my purpose of understanding trust as a mechanism on the level of

the social fabric of public urban life, this step to a more micro-level will not add to theorizing better.[7] Sztompka escapes from the challenge to define what is 'good' pragmatically by saying that most people welcome certain relations and find others appalling, and I see here the idea of Isaiah Berlin's "minimum of common moral ground" (cited in Riley, 2013) which is "inseparable from what we mean by a 'normal' human being with generic human capacities and vulnerabilities. This common moral minimum includes the idea of one common moral world composed of plural and conflicting basic values. But it also includes the idea that the moral world is divided by a boundary line of human decency that is universally recognized by normal human beings. (…) The idea that human survival, understood as the survival of all humans who are willing to cooperate with their fellows to achieve mutual peace, takes moral priority over competing goods is accepted by all normal people" (Riley 2013:62).[8] Misztal works with an idea of trust along similar lines, but goes a step further in that she maintains that such normative normality will make us act accordingly:

> "(…) [O]ur perception of collective order as normal is sustained by rule-following behaviour that makes our world predictable, reliable and legible. All these rules ensure that actors sustain each other's expectations of 'things as usual' which leads them to judge such situations as normal." (Misztal 2001:313)

To trust then just means to experience a social setting as familiar, which gives us an ontological security and secures our identities. I agree with the scholars on trust who reject the idea that trust is a decision made to take a certain action and everything else is confidence, as Luhmann (2000:97) differentiated. According to Misztal (2001), situational normalcy evokes trust even when according to our own personal values, we may reject the motives of other people's performances. I have used this idea to analyse how the residents of a US housing project, which they labelled "the Ghetto", differentiated between various settings with gun violence: people shared the normative normalcy of a world in which nobody would never should anybody – and hence the basic concept of decent life – but the situational normalcy was different. Yet under conditions in which gun violence had its presence, how to trust was still guided by moral principles of when and how gun violence should (not) happen. The women of the Ghetto who helped me understand their everyday life talked about violence in a "discourse of fate" (Blokland 2008), not agency, especially fearing for the fate of their sons and male partners, strongly interconnected with the 'cultural landscape' (Ness, 2004: 32) of the neighbor-hood and the structural inequalities shaping it. I differentiated between public violence, or physical harm to others in public, for example when one is caught in crossfire or otherwise suffer consequences of violence not directed at one's person (*street violence*), and situations in which one was involved in harming others, as agent or as victim (*personal violence*). I noticed a reduced sense of agency in facing the street violence in 'the G' as the rules of the game of the drug trade lost their predictability in situations where turfs were contested, younger generations less hierarchical organized and leadership positions less respected as older, retired men from the drug business said that they used to be in earlier times. Situational normalcy acquired through socialization and experience produces a sense of agency, and Sztompka would see this as trust, as the agent evaluates risks and the assessment of risks and expectations of the behaviour of

---

[7] See Stichcombe (1991) who wrote I bis explanation that a mechanism is "a piece of scientific reasoning which is independently verifiable and independently gives rise to theoretical reasoning, which gives knowledge about a component process of another theory thereby increasing the suppleness, precision, complexity, elegance or believability of the theory at the higher level (1991:367) that "telling a just-sp story about how individuals might possibly have acting so as to produce the aggregate pattern does not improve the theory unless there are new predictions implied."
[8] I learnt about Isaiah Berlin initially from Blokland, H. (1997) *Freedom and Culture in Western Society*. London: Routledge.

others (*expected* conduct, Sztompka 1999:53). Sztompka maintains that the expectations of the conduct of others form a continuum of expectations from those that require little effort to those that require a lot – or of low-risk to high-risk expectations. On the basis of instrumental expectations of how others will act, based on regularity, reasonability and efficiency, we can smoothly move through our social worlds (Sztompka 1999:53). As I have summarized earlier (Blokland 2017:PAGE), in many places, this means that "we expect shops to open at 9 am, as they do so every day (regularity). We expect that a bread will not increase in price with 100% overnight (reasonability, shaken in turbulent economic and war situations). We expect that the shop keeper is out there to make money (efficiency) and will hence work in the interest of the shop, and the more the shopkeeper relies on our return, the less likely he will be to cheat us. But such regularity is not always and everywhere organized in the same way by laws and regulations as it is for shops in London, Paris or Berlin. In Bogotá, shopping streets have three layers: official stores, including the 'outlet' stores of big sports clothing brands, licensed sellers of products with tables and other material assemblies, and sellers with their products on a piece of cloth or cardboard on the floor. Each of these ways of keeping shop has its own temporality, logic and thus expectations. The resident who knows the city well knows where to look for what at which time of the day or day of the week, and to expect to possibly find something unexpectedly, the idea that the regularity is the surprise, is one of the very workings of especially the third layer of street vendors, who sell what they acquire through circuits of recycling and things that fall of some wagon somewhere. While these are, as far as the municipality has not achieved its aims to license them, are non-legal practices but with logics of temporality and spatiality regulated in other than state's ways, and buyers and sellers similarly draw on instrumental expectations.

The instrumental trust based on such expectations is less vulnerable, Sztompka writes (1999:53), than trust in the moral performances of others. This seems to be the more interesting dimension of trust in relation to public space, and requires that we revisit the idea of optimism that Hardin brought up but did not reflect on much, and differentiate it from the influence that confidence in other mechanisms on other scales may take on a dyad of me and you interacting in public space, casually and without previous relational history. Luhmann pointed out that we "cannot live without forming expectations with respect to contingent events and you have to neglect, more or less, the possibility of disappointment. You neglect this (…) because you do not know what else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty and to withdraw expectations without having anything to replace them" (Luhmann 2000:97). I am not sure that Luhmann is right: globally speaking, people do live in a permanent stage of uncertainty and still see themselves through to the end of the day, so I think that a differentiation of scales will become useful to work with the relationship between ontological security and practices of trust. It is helpful to see these scales beyond the interactions between concrete people as confidence (Luhmann 2000:99-100). Mary Douglas would even go further: certainty, she argued, is an institution: it is only possible because doubt is *blocked* institutionally: to think of certainty as some sort of higher standard and see uncertainty as laming our actions is the opposite of how the world works anthropologically speaking: strong institutions "exert controls on knowledge" (Douglas 2001:145), so that "the place is positively littered with particular certainties" and let me add, for particular people. The certainty of how the police will act when I call them as a white middle class woman when my house gets broken into is of a higher predictability than when Lena, a woman I got to know well in the Ghetto, called them when her partner at the time "bothered her": they did not restrain him, and eventually she did time in prison as she had stabbed him with a knife: "if we recognize more uncertainty now, it will be because of things that have happened to the institutions underpinning our believes" (Douglas 2001;145). The way our societies have globalized and increased their complexity means that we always live under interdependencies with others, bringing Luhmann to conclude that we cannot entirely opt to be in- or outside of the system, and thus there is also a degree of cohesion, but we can lose our confidence in "the system" (Luhmann 2000:103). This makes it possible to not have confidence in the health system, but

still trust your doctor. The environmental activists that attempt to disturb familiarized practices of everyday urban life by gluing themselves to the asphalt of German urban highways may be described in this way: of course, they are part of "the system", as the police works on rather carefully dissolving the glue and processing their personal data after arrest, but they do not have confidence that the system will change to save the planet. When car drivers frustrated about their delays to get to wherever they needed to go brutally tried to remove the protesters personally, they faced charges and law specialists debated in the media whether they could or could not do so and what paragraph of their right to "self-defense" could possibly apply. Less clear-cut is what "the system" means outside of the context of a nation state as Germany, where Luhmann had his standpoint: in the rural towns of Colombia, for example, the monopoly of violence lies not with the state, and in Amazonia indigenous communities, a belief that technical medicine is not the best system to heal people may not dominate: to then argue with lack of confidence in "the system" puts the nation state and its normalized institutions hegemonically over other systems, which is neither empirically useful nor right from a perspective of academic ethics and de-centred epistemology. Sometimes system seems to mean state, and then we should say so. Calvin Warren (2016:37) writes after another Black boy being molested by the police in Baltimore, "Blacks lack being" in ethics, law and politics that do not work to redress the violence against Blacks that "rips apart" more than bodies. He urges us to think about the impossibility to think of such violence as pain to be attended to as an individual emotion rather than a metaphysical violence that constitutes an anti-Black world. The scars on a Black body as a violation is "a hieroglyph attesting to the brutality" (2016:39) that transfers to other people and other generations, and constitutes the Black existence. A lot of the thinking about trust points to the relevance of third party and authority in arguing that it is easier to draw on such instrumental expectations if a system is in place that sanctions in case of violation of the principles of conduct, while fully ignoring such epistemologies. When I buy something at a large department store or even at a well-established online firm, I know beyond reasonable doubt that in case it is not as expected, I have ways to go forward and get compensation. Anyone who has tried this with an airline knows that it is not always as easy, but in the moment of our transaction, we buy a plane ticket with the information that we can recourse to formalized procedures to get out money back if our plane is cancelled. For Hardin, it is not trust at all, but confidence: "confidence is a feeling or belief about a state of affairs or an event and (…) pertains to facts or things that actually happen": when professionals do not do what we expect of them, Barbalet (2019:25-26) points out, we do not lose our confidence in "the system" at once but likely question the competence of the professional. When the state's social worker of the department of children's protection services questions a person after a notification of the school of possible child neglect, the state level bureaucrat may meet the story of the mother with suspicion, and she may tell a truth in a certain way, because she has learnt from her own and other people's experiences that the state institution cannot be trusted to act in what she sees as her or her child's interests. Barbalet would, similar to Luhmann, call this confidence rather than trust: if the social worker manages to approach her in a certain way, an interpersonal trust relation may develop that allows the appearance of the truth (Blokland, Margies & Schilling 2025). Truthfulness is not a prerequisite to deal with each other well: as Small has shown in *Someone to Talk* Too (REF), we may hide truths from our most beloved to protect them, and yet be in trusting relations. To withhold information is not always an act that means that works against trust. In citizen-state relations, it may not be in my interest at all to reveal the state, because I can be confident that the state will not work in my interest if its agents would know my situation in detail: different from what I was taught in our aspiring middle-class family in years of strong social democracy where the national social-democratic leaders talked in terms of solidarity and the pearls of the welfare state. Although a waning narrative after the 1973 oil crisis already, and in the 'sociology of the welfare state' modules that the university taught, we learnt that "our" national state had progressed towards inclusion and was meant to be a cushion for all, and where it was not, it would have to be fixed so that it would be. White upwardly mobile families like the one I

grew up in, in the small towns of a small country, tended to see the state as the collective vehicle to work for a better world for all, which may have been naïve, because it never discussed the racist practices on which the Dutch wealth of capitalism was based and colonial history was hardly present in our text books, the violent repression by the Dutch state in Indonesia was still described as 'police actions' and the role of the Dutch in the historical construction of South Africa's Apartheid reduced to the necessity of a few traders to get fresh water and food so they built a fort on the edge of Afrika.[9] It was a limited, colonial epistemology, of course. Another dimension of it was, with all its restrictions, that the overall sense was one that the state was a machinery that was not always working well, but that one could have confidence in. It started to shift, of course, in the late 1970s and 1980s, when unemployment rates hit high and factory closures and other technological changes increased social inequalities. *** If I keep this then some statistics needed ***. In this epistemological ignorance, at least in my family, we may have had more trust in politicians than we do with what we learnt since, and see "the system" differently. Hardin argued that when we note that people have less trust in politicians, we ought to see that the reasons for this lay in problems becoming more global and less easily solvable while we still expect politicians to fix things for us. We may be very well right in having lost confidence that our political institutions are capable of doing things, as the influence of multimillionaire corporate actors has now become very obvious to all of us, and the influence of elites on political processes is no longer a matter of college rooms in prestigious universities where friendships are made, cigars smoked after expensive dinners in Clubs, although all of that still happens. It is a good idea to have scepticism. The more reason we have to critically and sceptically look at the lack of power of regular political actors and the processes of democracy as we have institutionalized them in many countries in the world, the more reason we also have to reflect on how we can and are building trust relations in other parts of civil society. When Putnam argued that civil society was waning in US American society, scholars have discussed his thesis critically, sometimes arguing that social movements were alive and well. In discussing trust in urban settings, we may need to reflect again on the fundamental changes that we have seen in urban civil society – here, too, digitalization has had impact, in an enabling and restricting way.

In many of our dealings with the state, the issue is not trust, but confidence, and trust relations can sometimes act as mediating: they can help to bridge the access to institutional resources where there is no confidence. And yet there are situations, sometimes discussed as 'weak states', where the state does not distribute institutional resources, beyond for public schools or some form of health provisions (Alvarez et al. 2025). In Columbia, as I learn from my friends, the scholars Alvarez and ____ , the state as an institutional agent for the provision of public goods is developing since the peace contract between armed groups and the constitution of 1991, and thus is at the start, rather than retreat, of its development.[10] I do not think that the literature that I am aware of reflects such global diversity in the relation between 'system' and 'state' very well. Often, system or society still tends to be seen as nation state (Giddens 1990).

Trust for Sztompka depends on the expectations that others will do the morally right or accepted, are fair and follow such rules with integrity. While I can handle an airline without thinking about its moral rightness, the street vendor requires me to think about this differently. The reasoning that losing confidence in the system means to not trust at all and generates a "new type of anxiety" that implies "a general suspicion of dishonest dealings" (Luhmann 2000:103) seems to assume that the state-oriented and thus Eurocentric model of modernity is the standard. This connects to a particular form of thinking about public space, namely a life in public that assumes that the state fixes the breaches of our trust in others through its legitimate use of violence. A decrease in such confidence may make people resort to "smaller world of purely local importance to new forms of 'ethnogenesis', to a fashionable longing for

[9] And then they "grew" in presence, simply, and *became* racist 'Boeren' – this narrative has not been changed everywhere so far. See: https://historiek.net/boerenoorlogen-afrika-boeren-britten-1880-1902/129117/

[10] Personal communication with Majo Alvarez and Juan Carlos ___ , 9.2.2025. See also:

an independent if modest living, to fundamentalist attitudes or other forms of retotalizing milieux and 'lifeworlds'", Luhmann wrote (2000:104), thereby offering us an interesting angle to understand the right-wing turn to such ideals from a perspective of public space, to which we will later return. Möllering argues that theorizing trust has been inspired by Georg Simmel but tends to overlook an important aspect of his work: a lot of attention goes to the functions of trust and the basis of trust (instrumental or moral, and so on), but Simmel's combination of "good reason with faith" as trust means that we take a "mental leap" between interpretation – that what we observe and categorize with the knowledge that we have – and expectation, and this means that we must look at how we interpret events in our everyday life as bringing or not bringing us what we had expected (Möllering2001:407) This is a bigger risk: 'the category of moral agents is certainly narrower than that of rational agents' (Sztompka 1999:54), but Mölllering (2001:411) convinced me that we do not trust by rational methods alone and that we can thus not analyse trust a sit it is an instrumental-rational process, because there is "no automatic logic connecting interpretation ('good reason') to trustful favourable expectations." When we trust, according to Möllering, and I would add also when we distrust, we thus reach a point in a relational setting in which we mutually accept our interpretations of the event while we know that there is the unknown and unresolved, which we ignore. Möllering (2004:417) calls this suspension: "the bracketing of the unknowable which represents a defining aspect of the nature of trust." It also shows that in order to engage in dis/trusting, we must have at least some idea of what is going on, because we can only suspend what we do not know based on interpretations. One late afternoon in Bogogtá, I had walked a long way and did not know anymore where I was. As it was getting dark and the street emptied, and the block I walked down had only one oddly out-of-place modern, light and linearly organized men's clothing store besides a few eateries, it felt not right, and I knew I was out of place: I was a lost gringa in a darkening street where people could be in need of money, and would rightly assume there could be something valuable in my backpack. I leaped to distrust and trust: I distrusted the people around me in the street and assumed they would not be out to support me if something would happen, and I assumed that the 'official' appearing store was a good place to enter, look at my phone, and order a taxi. So, I made two leaps in an instance, suspending the possibility that my observations of the young men in ragged clothes on the street pavement, the boys walking with a pace that I had learnt to connect with drug use in earlier experiences, were wrong and simply prejudice. I also suspended the possibilities that the store attendant would want me to leave the store, that the ordered taxi was not reliable, or a million other things that theoretically could happen. I withheld, in other words, other people my trust based on their group membership, and had I known the people in that street better, this may have been different (Schmid et al. 2014) – but would not necessarily mean I would have trusted everyone, in that moment, in the particular situation in which we found ourselves.

The stronger an event is backed up by enforceable legal and other institutionalized mechanisms of control, the easier it may be to suspend suspicion in the direction of cooperation, because on another level, system confidence may help us do so. It is a bit of a risky business, though. We are more vulnerable when we trust on the basis that people will not be selfish and not put their own interests first, that they will act with the welfare of others in mind, or that they are generous and benevolent (Sztompka 1999: 54). In a liquid society under globalization, it is clear that to trust, is a bigger challenge than it was, and in some places is, in more strictly regulated, less flexible social settings, especially in those where morality was – or is – not a matter of the mind, but of religious beliefs or traditions. This too is a way in which suspending the awareness that we have no way of knowing if what we expect will follow from what we have interpreted, a leap of faith, but one that is eased by confidence. Power relations are implicit in such ideas of 'self-evident' morality" (Blokland 2017:PAGE), and thus beyond the village of Meir Shalev's novel, there are still other relational settings in which trust is not a matter of the mind. Karen Jones defends that "trust is an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will extend to cover the domain of our interaction with her, together with the expectation that the one trusted

will be directly and favourably moved by the thought that we are counting on her" (Jones 1996:4) and considers this optimism as central. We will only be trustworthy for others when we are "willing to give significant weight to the fact that the other is counting on one, and so will not let hat consideration be overruled by just any other consideration" (Jones 1996:8). She hence implicitly shows the connection to un/caring, as we assume that other people care about us and will move from there to taking care and being careful. But she also works from a standpoint that assumes that others are prepared to receive our trust and reciprocate it, against the critical perspective of authors like Calvin Warren (2016), who do not see this possibility given for Black people in the USA, or Survillan and Tuana (2007:4-7), who describe such positions as ignorance of injustice, cruelty and suffering that result from situatedness in Wester philosophical traditions. To presuppose an individual willing is to fail to see the ontological interdependence that affects how we think about individuals in the first place. This is a selective interpretation of what we see, or a "blinkered vision": "it shields from view a whole range of interpretations about the motives of another and restricts the inferences we will make about the likely actions of others." Different from Hardin who sees optimism or pessimism as something we happen to have as a personality characteristic, thanks to our good or bad parents in some uncleared way, Jones thinks of trusting optimism as a habit that develops with often unnoticed moments of "momentary trust" (1996:13). Maybe when we ask people to respond to a question of general trust, it is their optimism: their capabilities (not only, as Jones writes, their willingness) to give significant weight to our counting on each other without letting other considerations rule over. We do not engage in trusting or distrusting all the time at all, and when we say we do not trust, this does not mean that we distrust: "one may simply not adapt any attitude at all toward the goodwill and competence of another" (Jones 1996:16) but for example rely on other mechanisms that make the urban fabric work – policing, law enforcement, informal social control.

6 Trust as habituation and urban care

Sztompka assigns central values of decency such as loyalty, reciprocity, solidarity, respect and justice to the moral space of trusting and assumes that the 'good' we do in interpersonal relations scale up to other levels of the social fabric when we do them all the time, they become the things that we "do as is done" and then become what "ought to be done" (Sztompka 2019:33) in a process of what he calls "a meaning industry" that involves all forms of communication and expression between people that "negotiate meanings" in which "consensus emerges" and what mattered between you and me eventually matters also between strangers: the "inertia of culture" then makes this habituation difficult to chance or challenge. Such meaning industry may also affect the leap into the unknown when it impedes our possibilities to see what is happening.

Habits, "dispositions" for both continuity and change that consist of "the contraction of past activities into present actions" (Misztal 2019:50) have a "common root" with trust in "familiarity, past experience and risk avoidance", writes Misztal (2019:42) and help us manage "discontinuity" in times where trust cannot, she believes. It is worth quoting her at length, because she brings together eloquently that where mistrust dominates a relational setting, people may seek a way to of the laming effect of not knowing ow to make sense of the social by turning to their habits, as "anchors" (Misztal 2019:57):

> "In solving problems of trust, which comes to play in situations involving vulnerability of one party to the other as well as unpredictability and uncertainty, people select strategies that reduce vulnerability, undermine unpredictability and control uncertainty. When people opt for habitual actions (…) trust in habit [is] a mechanism for coping in the unsettled world. The decision to trust habit is based on some information about the expected repetitiveness of the other party's

action (…) when deciding to trust habit, we do not follow our interests or moral standards, but we rather follow our knowledge about the predictability of observed actions." (Misztal 2019:47)

To trust habit "normalizes the internal organization" of a relational setting, but Misztal sees this setting as somehow closed, and this conflicts with the understanding of space as relational and in progress of always becoming, as is core of the idea of throwntogetherness. Habits support our wish, desire or necessity to personally 'tame' our environment, in Barbara Misztal's words, as "conservative agent" – habit conserves care and life – and enable us to get used to stuff, and that gives us a sense of safety and control, much like Giddens' idea of ontological security. Habit is not conservative in the sense of unchanging, fixed, or boring: although every 1st of January we may make resolutions to start new habits, we know it is difficult to do so, but people *do* give up smoking, stop drinking, start running and do all sorts of things that at some point they think of as 'habits.' Habits and customs "form the texture of everyday life" (Das 2012:139) but we overlook them as we stress the intentionality and agency, instead of seeing the individual as more "in the flux of collective life" (Das 2012:140). Studies show that people increasingly do things automatically if they do them repetitively until they reach a certain "plateau" where we stop thinking about them, but this work takes them as daily tasks (Lally et al. 2010; having difficulty with the project of writing This Book, I started to write every morning at 7 am with a cup of coffee in my pyjamas to reach a plateau of writing out of habit, for example). Conceptually, there is thus no reason to think that doing certain things in certain ways habitually is resistant to change or transformation.
This contradicts with the idea that habits are somehow boring: The meaning industry contains all meaning-making processes, but media, and especially social media, are certainly of a rapidly growing importance. Trust is the underlying principle for Sztompka for relations of loyalty, reciprocity, solidarity, respect and justice, because "they cannot exist without some underlying trust" (Sztompka 2019:34):

> "Trust is the belief expressed in trustful action, that others are trustworthy, i.e. will meet our expectations and behave properly towards ourselves. Because we cannot be certain, the action in such conditions of uncertainty involves risk. Turning our confidence into action, we take the risk, we gamble, we make ourselves vulnerable to possibly abuse or breach of trust. Hence the simple definition I propose: trust is a bet about the future, contingent actions of others." (Sztompka 2019:35)

The idea of a 'bet' may not be the ideal choice of words, as it is rather a confident expectation of a favourable outcome (Lasceaux 2018:1), and while it remains a gamble in the sense that it always includes the possibility that we made a mistake when we trusted. Barbalet, Hardin and Luhmann would rather not mix trust and confidence, but important is that Sztompka teaches us that uncertainty is inherent to trust, and social life is contingent and thus always uncertain, not in the least because intended actions have unintended consequences, and I do not have setto set out to harm someone for it to happen. The tragic element of for example middle-class progressive residents engaging in a community garden project in The Ghetto was that the disappointment of that experience for some of the participants had very little to do with their intentions, and a lot with the mismatch of mutual expectations and generalizations, as I wrote elsewhere in more detail out of my concern that form my undergraduate and graduate training in empirical sociology, mainstream social theory, and anthropology, as well as my progressive political orientation, it concerns me that the current scholarship that I knew of, did not help me see why a revanchist agenda in our cities be so powerful as it was, if we are unwilling to presume that the everyday world is filled with revanchists who feel their world has been stolen (the current elections in many North European countries sometimes make me doubt if maybe we got so lost after

all?). As intentions and attitudes are impossible to measure well, and even those who try argue that preferences do not define choices but cluster in social networks and these do (Ehlert et al. 2020). They are also difficult to theorize with and eventually will not give us the screws to turn for thinking about an urban utopia as imagined by Friedman (2000). I will ignore the question of individual motives and intentions, and discuss what happens socially in public life, even if people entered relations with the best of intentions to make life beautiful for all, if you want, according to their definition of what such beauty may be, or instead, did not think about others in such a way. I will try to stay on this analytical level even when, in chapter three, we enter the tricky field of hate as social phenomena that is usually studied on the psychological level.

The good life features implicitly in a lot of the writings on trust that does not stick to the convenience of rational choice. Following Friedman, while we do not need politics in science, none of us can escape ideology (which is why calling something 'ideology' to reject it or to shame someone for being 'ideological' generally makes no sense), the "deep set of beliefs of how the world works". And against the tide, sociology should always be utopian, in the sense of "breaking through the barriers of convention into a sphere of the imagination where many things beyond our everyday experience become feasible", and it is quite simple: while some may think that the city is at the disposal of the rich (thanks to their 'merit'!) to play, they don't seem to see the damage they're doing, like the child building the castles with its back to the sea: they miss "the necessity of continuing to search for the 'common good' of a city if only because, without such a concept, there can be neither a sense of local identity [for its citizens, TB] nor a political community" (Friedman 2000:465). I think Sztompka would agree with Friedman. Sztompka defines solidarity as the readiness to sacrifice for 'the community' (whatever that may be) and remains thin on ideas of respect, which he simply sees as a mechanism that helps us believe that appreciation will meet our efforts or contributions to social life. The Dutch sociologist Aafke Komter (2004) is more precise, but defines it as a capacity that we may easily understood – and falsely so – as an individual characteristic, as translated in "concrete civility" of "the capacity to regard fellow-citizens with good will and treat them accordingly, and the capacity, when necessary, to give precedence to the common good, or public responsibility, over individual and self-interest" (Komter 2004:10). Like Komter, Sztompka is clearly worried that we fail to recognize that trust is "the foundation on which the edifice of good society stands" (2019:39), as all moral relations require trust, and they...:

> "…permit individuals to be open, innovative, creative thanks to the sense of existential security, to a strong social identity (…) [though] the predictability of others' actions and the ability to plan one's own actions. Without a place in the inter-human space and without recognized values, the fate of a person, as Thomas Hobbes wrote, is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." (Sztompka 2019:38)

Komter has expressed similar concerns with regard to solidarity and sacrifice, sees them affected negatively by individualization, and introduces the necessity of a capacity of "putting oneself in the imaginary position of the other" (Komter 2004:107) as an essential feature of the solidarity that Sztompka expects trusting relations to be able to generate: "Only a self, mirroring the imagined viewpoints of others, is a self [that is] capable of solidarity. Being able to sympathize with the predicament of another person is a key precondition to solidarity (…). The individualization may have contributed to a change in exactly this respect." She switches between sympathy and recognition, and I believe recognition is the more useful one of the two, and will return to the importance of recognition through some of Honneth's writings at a later point.

These writers did not explicitly address our throwntogetherness (and are not urban studies scholars) in terms of care. The current debate on urban care in urban studies carries a lot of similar ideas, in different

terms. The influential work of Fisher and Tronto focusses less on the dual processes of increasing of scale and decreasing of scale that Sztompka or Komter would think about in terms of individualization and globalization and Hardin simply sees as us meeting more people than our grandparents did, as they write that "caring is a positive dimension of our lives that has been socially devalued by a capitalist and/or patriarchal order" (1990:35) with a clear but problematic suggestions that historically, we had better days. That liberal thinkers like Hardin do not put care central in their perspective of agents acting rationally is certainly a valid observation, and they importantly point out that care is more that stuff that simply needs to be done with the right motivation (Fisher & Tronto 1990:36) and the definition of care that they develop is broad enough to include all Sztompka's moral relations: "a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our world so that we can live as well as possible." We can care about (paying attention to our world focused on sustainability), take care of (respond to the necessities of continuity and repair), give care and receive care (Fisher & Tronto 1990:40-42). To care about something requires knowledge, and to take care of something requires access to resources to do so and the judgement of making the choice to choose one action over another, which in turn is related to power positions. Out of the blue, Fisher and Tronto then suggest that communities of care-giving are trust building, but fail to discuss what they mean by trust. One is left with the impression that trust is a nice thing to have that we receive when others treat us well, because they care about and for us. Sometimes I wonder a little what the fuss of discussing care is all about, because beyond the point that it makes it easier to look at the world from the standpoint of women which is generally a productive idea for sociology, I have yet to discover its conceptual gain. The large trunk of studies that use the notion of care to study quite common local interactions, community development and community ties seems often old wine in new barrels. This is not always the case, of course. Clara Han (2011) analyzed the domestic struggles to care of kin in a peripheral neighborhood in Santiago, Chile. The infinity of responsibility of care in kin relations was a continuous struggle – largely connecting the domestic expectations of trust to credit arrangements in the market and affective enactments of relations through monetary transactions – to counterbalance the diffusion of the differentiation of *casa* (house) and *calle* (street). The micropolitics of who cares for what and whom and with which understanding of temporality helped me to understand that who is to trust has an indeterminacy in many everyday lived relations. The "emotional generosity" of the mother in the household to not destroy the kin relationships was contra the evidence of being taken advantage of, one could say, and yet she continued with a "moral courage" (Lascaux 2018:14) – actions that could be seen as breach of trust could just as well be interpreted as the consequence of unwarranted trust (Lascaux 2018:9) for which there need not be a rational explanation. But from the ordinary ethics of our simple, mundane practices, we could see that to do urban life always means to surpass ourselves, and this that care "signifies , in the first instance, looking after or looking out for, the well-being of others" which means that anthropologists think of it in relation to kinship, and as evaporating the distinction between "the rational and the sensory" - and it is ethical, because we always think of taking acre of something as doing things *well* (Lambek 2010:16). The disposition of care that Lambek describes does not deviate much from what others have describes as trust: the disposition to care for others is the trustfulness in their theories, and helps to see why we find it so important to value relationships with people whom we trust, because they have allowed us to see that their practices in which they engage with us are not solely instrumental (Lambek:2016:21). Much of the time that current authors, however, thus write about caring, I would say that they describe relational settings of trust – the ordinary ethics that they ascribe to the work of care – feeding the child, clothing the baby, cleaning the house – are not inherently ethics of care but can be suffocating duties out of which women see no escape without losing their lives: what makes these ordinary ethics is the grounding in agreement that the immediacy of the task at hand is theirs, by the feature of them being women in kinship relations of care, and this agreement brings with it that they do care work with care: free of violence and with the well-being of others at their horizon.

When Bill Furlong, a coal and timber merchant who is the protagonist in the short novel of Claire Keegan,[11] takes home a young woman locked in the barn of a 'wash house' where young women fallen out of grace have been put to work and everyone knows without ever talking about it that the conditions of these outsiders are beyond what a human being should be living through, and as they carry on through the snow, watched by other people from the town who all know him, Furlong asks himself "was there any point in being alive without helping one another? Was it possible to carry on along through all these years (…) through an entire life, without once being brave enough to go against what was there and yet (…) face yourself in the mirror?" He acted out trust to the girl he took home to his family, and it is a good example – and a common trope in literature, of course – of the trusting acts that express an ordinary ethics of care. Ordinary ethics do not rely on some abstract ideas about what is good for the world and judgements that we make in an abstracted thinking about that world but are contained in the immediacy of everyday practices in our everyday life (Das 2012:134), and thus shape urban spaces. But they also depend on the potential environment (Gans 1991): how could Furlong have learnt about the girl freezing locked up in a shed of the wash house if it was not for him driving his truck to deliver coals for their heating just before Christmas? Furlong may be said to have had a moral compass of compassion and kindness and possibly religious belief, but none of these things would enable the caring for strangers if the encounter with strangers did not take place. For doing moral work, our interdependencies need to turn into encounters where we can casually learn that out moral compass is required to do work. Rule following or merely doing what conventions want us to do is not necessarily part of this work. Here we see the difference between trust and confidence: whereas confidence in the workings of dominant institutions may make me follow the rules that the status quo expects me to adhere to, a lack of such confidence may invite me to negotiate my own trusting relations with people with whom I engage in my everyday routines so that rule following in itself is not a moral practice (Das 2012:134). The moral strivings, as Veena Das (2012:135) notes, may still be quite far away from the situatedness of the everyday: the situationally normal does not have to match with what we think of as normatively normal (Misztal 2001:Page). Das illustrates this with fieldwork in Delhi, where "how one is with others" matters. These practices of care show that there is not a way of understanding such care as merely the work that women routinely do. Caring duties ideally come from and bring about an ethics of care, but I do not think that they should be seen as one. What makes them one is trusting, and without their ethics, the work draws on distrust, and pain. Lambek reinforced that a theory of practice, as Bourdieu's, should not only pay attention to routinized dispositions but also see that to take care of others and carry out tasks with others in one's consideration is a disposition, and that in contrast to Bourdieu's approach, we do not have to assume that we are all just trying to understand the game that is played in order to play it so well that we can stay on top by seeking goods – accredited value or recognition – in another field: we may also practice for the sake of practice and *just care* (see Lambek 2010:21).

7 Conclusion

Note to reader: I am aware that the above still lacks enough structure and am sorry to read you through the ramble! What, in conclusion then, should we take away from this overview of the theories?I have typed this up in the next few pages, but it is very much a first draft!

Trust is not an attitude but a relational construct, so the idea that we trust a city government, or a local state is not the most productive way to think about this: it would be better to see this as confidence, and not to impose the concept of trust on everything. If that is what we do, then, the question is how trust as a feature of relations on the level of citizen-citizen relations and the citizen-state relations follows from and is embedded in such confidence. It is in institutional confidence more than on trust relations that

[11] Claire Keegan (2021) *Small Things Like These*. London: Faber, p.108

structuring conditions of colonialism, racism, sexism, gender exclusions and class inequalities play out – but there are also ways of such structuring conditions seeping into everyday relations, and this needs more attention. Saying something needs more attention is a common thing sociologists do, and it does not quite clarify what this attention will bring. The emulation of understandings of one context to another is not just horizontal: it also crosses various scales, especially in times of digitalization. So my lack of confidence in institutions that I have been socialized to know are not taking my interests seriously and generally are incapable of recognizing me may prep me in a certain way to enter my next interaction. When Sara Ahmed describes how a body that enters a space is already marked by indicators of strangeness in ways that bodies that confirm to white dominance are not – she is correct, of course. But without retreating to a level of blaming anyone, as all of this I consider as relational processes and not persons with certain attitudes propelling themselves into situations, the emulation also happens on 'the othered side'. When I analyzed the interactions in a community garden project in College Town, a US American medium-sized city, I found a lot of good intentions among all people involved. Good intentions alone, however, did not produce good results: the planted trees did die. The progressive white middle class residents that participated in these events were fully aware of the racial discrimination and the stigmatization that came with living in "The Ghetto" and yet with all their self-reflection, they could not create trusting relations. Why not? Definitely not because the housing project residents were particularly distrustful people. I think they quite genuinely liked each other.

What the conclusion needs to say:

1. Trust is relational and you cannot trust the government

2. An affective setting of trust or an emotional sphere of trust is possible on a more collective level, and we take clues. The less familiar we are with a social setting, the more difficult it is to understand what sort of trust practices happen in these settings or develop in these settings. The more familiar we are with a setting, the more we have learnt by experience what are the trustful and distrustful signals that others express, and the more sensitivity we have for this, However, this is not just a matter of our personal interpretations of individual social interactions. On the contrary. Although Durkheim hats lost popularity, he has not been 'replaced' by anything better: it makes sense to think again about collective consciousness, because when we enter settings, whatever word we choose – atmosphere, affectional setting, emotional settings, moral geographies and many other fancy words that have recently been introduced – it returns to the same thing that we think of a setting where we act as already having its history, its power relations, and its framing of its meanings, from where we think about what may happen next. Sure this may have been said before and sure it is old stuff, but that does not make it less true. Should we still pay attention to it? I think we should. Because in whatever way dominant ideologies, capitalist relations, property relations and the like work down on the everyday level, the everyday level is still where we *live.* Bayat was not necessarily writing about our contemporary global North streets, but the importance of the streets has not at all disappeared. It has become increasingly the space shaped by those who cannot withdraw in their undisrupted spaces, made possible by a backstage of people who clean, repair, fix and bake, make and cook. The invisibility of these practices in our urban worlds for the middle and upper-middle classes are quite striking. The street that I use, grabbing my coffee on my way, is a different street, at least but not only in temporality, from the back street where the containers of the coffee shop are placed, where the deliveries are made, and where cats and rats search the trash containers, and sometimes people do, too. The Disneyland has a backstage, and so do the 15-minute walkable sanitized urban sites that we are shaping for the middle classes. It is right there and yet made invisible. The materiality of our cities represents 'silent participants': design is a topic

worth a book in itself, and I will not pay attention to it here: others have excellently show that design can "pacify" through sensual experiences (Frers 2006:249). Scholars have regularly referred to Potsdamer Platz in Berlin, Germany, as an example of urban space where movements are constrained by obstacles, bottle-necks, and soundscape, as well as visibility through security cameras and lightening. Such work convincingly shows that design alone can already affect comfort and suffering: "design can produce specific, highly controlled normalities that are based on spatial and material constellations in which principles of visibility or perceivability in general are governing" (Frers 2006:259). Frers sees it as problematic that such design prohibits conflicts, but I would like to stress that the visibility of design also invisible-izes and transgresses other forms of urban life to other spaces, and that the social segregation is problematic not only because everyone should be entitled to rest and take a seat on Potsdamer Platz – where there are very few benches. That is a common point made in the study of public space. I want to stress that the streets have their back alleys, and that in these back alleys, those relegated to the back because of the fragmentation that finds its cause in the deliver-me-what-I-want type of service economy that we have entered strengthens this division. When the chain coffee store now sells coffee in cups on which the barrister writes my first name, she serves me a cupcake that as arrived there through a production chain that I know nothing about, and that is different from the cupcakes sold on the edge of the most marginal favela at a small wooden shack that is the only 'coffee shop' around, where the owner chatted while pouring coffee about the challenges to keep her bakery running with the water supply cuts happening all the time, and it is the very same city, it is two cupcakes, and yet there is no relation anymore between the baker of the cupcakes in the city center and me getting my coffee, personalized by my first name written on the paper cup with a marker with the quick handwriting of a barrister who does so because she is paid to do exactly that but really never wanted to learn my name. In some cities, the inequalities that are at the base of the fragmented city may be more obvious than in others: in Melville, Johannesburg, the only people walking the streets are those who do not have a car, and these are Black South-Africans walking down the streets of fenced-in, highly secured houses where drivers, cleaners and care-takers work, and sometimes also live-in.

3. We shape life creatively and ad-hoc and through improvisations in the context of such larger processes, and the context of misrecognition shapes how we form practices of recognition of others. But we can only do so in settings that feel safe. And the experience of safety, in turn, depends on how well we can figure out whether we enter a setting where overall social relations are reigned by trust – or not. So, when I went into the peripheries of Bogota, for us it was a situation where I had to learn to leave my socialization behind me and engage with the possibility of trusting as others did by experience. There was a Japanese-built jeep with benches in the back, and that provided a semi-public transport in parts of the city where there was no public transport at all. We had left the official bus and walked a few hundred meters to where these cars were parked. Drivers and other men stood around, and my friend Sandra negotiated the entry to the cars, and we climbed in the back of the trucks. I trusted my friend, and thus I trusted that situation, but when we drove up the mountain of the informal settlement fast, without seatbelts, my trust in my friend erased my socialized lack of trust in the driver, in the quality of the cars, or the upcoming traffic from the other side (which was very low). How well we figure out if we are safe in social settings, thus depends strongly again on our relations, our socializations and our experiences. So urban settings "breath" affect, "breath" that these are relational settings of trust and distrust, and what happens next in these settings depends on what was there before and does not only depend on specific interpersonal social interactions. And what was there before is not only determined what was there in a particular situation at a particular point in time at that particular location, but here we do carry patterns of dominant

ideas of what the world is like into moments of relational exchanges and it is always easier to see how distrust settles itself than how trust emerges. Distrust nested itself into relations quickly once we start to emulate what we have learnt into new encounters and see the reinforcements of the 'vice' that we have observed – Robert Merton had already noted in the 1960s that the self-full-filling prophecy of turning virtue into vice once categorizations and stereotypes have been attached to bodies is easier done and more difficult destructed than the maintenance of virtue for those who are structurally located in positions of disadavantage: after all, inequality is made durable by the stories we tell, and stories of distrust help keeping such inequalities in place.

References (*List that covers all text written so far, not just this document*)

Ahmed, S. (2000) *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality.* London: Routledge.
Ahmed, S. (2004) Collective feelings of the impressions left by others. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 21(2):25-42.
Alsayyad, N. (2003) Urban informality as a 'new' way of life. In: *Urban Informality: Transnational Prespectives from the Middle East, Latin America and South Asia.* PLACE: Lexington, 7-30.
Arendt, H. (2016). On violence. In *Democracy: A Reader* (pp. 566-574). Columbia University Press.
Askew, M. (2009) Landscapes of fear, horizons of trust: Villagers dealing with danger in Thailand's insurgent youth. *Journal of South East Asian Studies* 40(1):59-86
Atkinson, R. (2020) *Alpha City: How London Was Captured by the Super-rich*. London:Verso.
Auyero, J. (2020). *Patients of the state: The politics of waiting in Argentina*. Duke University Press.
Bachmann, R. (1998). Conclusion: Trust–conceptual aspects of a complex phenomenon. In: Lane, Christel, and Reinhard Bachmann (eds), *Trust Within And Between Organizations: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Applications*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 298-322.
Barbalet, J. (2019) The experience of trust: Its content and basis. In: M. Sasaki (ed) *Trust in Contemporary Society*. Boston: Brill, 11-30.
Benz, T. (2014) At the intersection of urban sociology and criminology: Fear of crime and the postindustrial city. *Sociology Compass* 8 (1):10-19.
Bhan, G. (2019) Notes on a Southern urban practice. *Environment and Urbanization*, 31(2):639-654.
Bauman, Z. (2017) *Retrotopia.* Cambridge: Polity.
Blokland, H. (1997) *Freedom and Culture in Western Society*. London: Routledge.
Blokland, T. (2008) Facing violence: Everyday risks in an American housing project. *Sociology* 42(4):601-617.
Blokland, T. (2012) Blaming neither the undeserving poor nor the revanchist middle classes: A relational approach to marginalization. *Urban Geography*, 33(4):488–507.
Blokland, T. (2017) The public life of social capital. *The SAGE handbook of the 21st century city*, 552-566.
Busso, S. (2014) Modern institutions between trust and fear: Elements for an interpretation of legitimation through expertise. *Mind Soc* 13:247_256.
Caffentzis, G. & S. Federici (2014) Commons against and beyond capitalism. *Community Development Journal* 49(S1):i92-i105.
Carswell, G., Chambers, T., & De Neve, G. (2019) Waiting for the state: Gender, citizenship and everyday encounters with bureaucracy in India. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, 37(4):597-616. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263774X18802930
Ceccato, V. (2016) Public space and the situated conditions of crime and fear. *International Criminal Justice Review* 26(2):69-79.
Cook, T.E. & P. Gronke (2005) The skeptical American: Revisiting the meanings of trust in government and confidence in institutions. *The Journal of Politics* 67(3):784-803.
Das, V. (1976) Masks on faces: An essay on Punjabi kinship. *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 10(1):1-30.
Das, V. (2008) Violence, gender, and subjectivity. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 37(1):283-299.
Das, V. (2012) Ordinary ethics. In: Fassin, D. (ed.) *A Companion to Moral Anthropology.* Publisher: Place. 133-149.
Deutsch, M. (1958) Trust and suspicion. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2(4):265-279.
Deutsch, M. (1960) Trust, trustworthiness and the F-scale. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 61(1):138-140.
Douglas, M. (1986) *How Institutions Think.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Douglas, M. (2001) Dealing with uncertainty. *Ethical Perspectives* 8(3):145-157.
Duff, C. (2009) The drifting city: The role of affect and repair in the development of 'enabling environments.' *International Journal of Drug Policy* 20(2009):202-208.
Ehlert, A., M. Kindschi, R. Algesheimer & R. Rauhut (2020) Human social preferences cluster and spread in the field *PNAS* 117(37):22787-22792.
Ellin, N. (2003) Fear and city building. *The Hedgehog Review* (Fall 03): NP.
Ermisch, J. & D. Gambetta (2010) Do strong family ties inhibit trust? *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 75(3):365-??
Felder, M. (2021) Familiarity as a practical sense of place. *Sociological Theory* 39(3):180-199.
Fisher, B. & J, Tronto (1990) Toward a feminist theory of caring. In: E. Abel & M. Nelson (eds) *Circles of Care*. New York: Suny Press, 36-54.
Frers, L. (2006) Pacification by design: A ethnography of normalization techniques. In: Berking, H., S. Frank, L. Frers, M. Löw, L. Meier, S. Steets, and S. Stoetzer (eds.) *Negotiating Urban Conflicts : Interaction, Space and Control* Place: Transcript Verlag, 249–262.
Friedmann, J. (2000) The good city: In defense of utopian thinking. *IJURR* 242:460-472.
Gardner, C.B. (1980) Passing by: Street remarks, address rights and the urban female. *Sociological Inquiry* 50(3/4):328-356.
Gilbert, A. (2003) Love in the time of enhanced capital flows: Reflections on the links between liberalization and informality. In: Roy, A. & N. Alsayyad (eds) *Urban Informality: Transnational Prespectives from the Middle East, Latin America and South Asia.* PLACE: Lexington, 33-60.
Gorbunova, L.A., J. Ambrasat, C. Von Scheve (2015) Neighborhood stereotypes and interpersonal ties in social exchange: An experimental study. *City & Community* 14(2):206-224.
Gray, E., J.Jackson & S. Farrall (2011) Feelings and functions in the fear of crime. *British Journal of Criminology* 51:75-94.
Hardin, R. (1996) Trustworthiness. *Ethics* 107(1):26-42.
Hardin, R. (2006) *Trust*. Cambridge: Polity.
Hochschild, A.R. (2003) Working on feeling. In: L. Desfor Edles & S. Appelrouth (eds) *Sociological Theory in the Contemporary Era*, PUBL?, 303-312.
Honneth, A. (2012) *The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition.* Cambridge: Polity.
Jeffrey,D. (2016) A duty of kindness. *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine.* 109(7):PAGES?
Jenkins, R. (1996) *Social Identity.* London: Routledge.
Jenkins, R. (1998) From criminology to anthropology? Identity, morality, and normality in the social construction of deviance. In: WHO? (ed) *Thinking about criminology*, 133-160.
Jones, K. (1996) Trust as an affective attitude. *Ethics* 107(Oct. 1996):4-25.
Kathialvelu, L. & T. Bunnell (2018) Introduction: Urban friendship networks, affective negotiations and potentialities of care. *Urban Studies* 20(8):491-504.
Katsaura, O. (2017). Theo-urbanism: Pastoral power and Pentecostals in Johannesburg. *Culture and Religion*, *18*(3), 232-262.
Kern, L. (2016) Rhythms of gentrification: Eventfulness and slow violence in a happening neighbourhood. *Cultural Geographies* 23(3):411-457.
Kissling, E.A. (1991) Street harassment: The language of sexual terrorism. *Discourse & Society* 2(4):451-460.
Komter, A. (2004) Solidarity and sacrifice. In: L.M. Stoneham (ed) *Advances in Sociology Research.* New York: Nova Science, 205-231.
Lally, ?? et al (2010) How are habits formed: Modelling habit formation in the real world. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 40:989-2009.
Lambek, M. (2010) Introduction. In Lambek, M. (ed.) *Ordinary Ethics: Anthropology, Language and Action.* Place: Fordham University Press, 1-36.

Lancaster, William (1995) *The Department Store: A Social History*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
Lascaux, A. (2018) Trust and uncertainty: A critical re-assessment. *International Review of Sociology* 18(1):1-18.
Lewis, D.J. & A, Weigert (1985) Trust as social reality. *Social Forces* 63(4):967-985.
Lofland, L. H. (1989). Social life in the public realm: A review. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 17(4):453-482.
Luhmann, N. (2000) Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. In: Gambetta, D. (ed.) *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relati*ons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 94-107.
Massey, D. (1993) Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place. In: (EDS?) Bird? *Mapping the Future*, London: Routledfge? 59-69.
Massey, D. (1999) Space-time, 'science' and the relationship between physical geography and human geography. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geography* NS 24: 261-276.
McAllister, A.J. (1995) Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. *Academy of Management Journal* 38(1):24-39.
McPherson, M. & L. Smith-Livin (2006) Social isolation in America: Changes in core discussion networks over two decades. *American Sociological Review* 71(June):353-375.
McQuarie, M. (2017) The revolt of the Rust Belt: Place and politics in the age of anger. *British Journal of Sociology* 68(S1):120-152.
Mische, A. & M.J. Chandler (2018) Narratives, networks and publics. In: (Eds?) *Routledge Handbook of Cultural Sociology*, London: Routledge, 478-485.
Misztal, B. (2003) Durkheim in collective memory. *Journal of Classical Sociology* 3(2):123-143.
Misztal, B. (2019) Trust in habit: A way of coping in unsettled times. In: M. Sasaki (ed) (2019) *Trust in Contemporary Society.* Boston: Brill, 41-58.
Mitchell, D. (1995) The end of public space? People's Park, definitions of the public, and democracy. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 85(1):108-133.
Nash, J. (1975) Bus riding: Community on wheels. *Urban Life* 4(1):99-124.
Neal, Z.P. (2009) Locating Public Space. In: Orum, A.M. & Z.P. Orum (eds.) *Common Grounds? Readings and Reflections on Public Space.* London: Routledge, 1-12.
Möllering, G. (2006). Trust, institutions, agency: Towards a neo-institutional theory of trust. In: Bachman, R. & Zaheer, A. (eds.) *Handbook of Trust Research*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 355-376.
Pain, R. (2001) Gender, race, age and fear in the city. *Urban Studies* 38(5/6):899-913.
Peterson, M. (2017) Living with diversity in hyper-diverse areas: how important are encounters in semi-public spaces? *Social & Cultural Geography* 18(8):1067-1085.
Rae, D. W. (2008) *City: Urbanism and its End*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Schmid, K., A. Al Ramich & M. Hewstone (2014) Neighbourhood …?
Siebel, W. & J. Wehrheim (2003) Öffentlichkeit und Privatheit in der überwachten Stadt. *disP – The Planning Review*, 39(153):4-12.
Simone, A. & E. Pieterse (2017) *New Urban Worlds: Inhabiting Dissonant Times*, London: John Wiley & Sons.
Smith, D.M. (1999) Geography, community and morality. *Environment and Planning A* 31:19-55.
Stark, R. (1987) Deviant places: A theory of the ecology of crime. *Criminology* 25(4):893-909.
Strickland, L. (1958) Surveillance and trust. *Journal of Personality*, 26(2):200-215.
Stub, P.J. & T.B. Priest (1976) Two patterns of establishing trust: The marijuana user. *Sociological Focus* 9(4).399-411.
Sztompka, P. (2019) Trust in the moral space. In: M. Sasaki (ed) (2019) *Trust in Contemporary Society.* Boston: Brill, 31-40.
Stinchcombe, A.L. (1991) The conditions of fruitfulness of theorizing about mechanisms in social science. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 21(3):367-388.

Survillan, S. & N. Tuana (2007) Introduction. In: Survillan, S. & N. Tuana (eds*) Race and Epistemological Ignorance*. New York: SUNY Press, 1-10.
Thieme, T. (2016) The Ghetto will always be my living room: Hustling and belonging in a Nairobi slum. In: Lancione, M. (ed.) *Rethinking Life from the Margins.* London: Routlegde, 120-135.
Márquez, L., & Soto, J. J. (2021). Integrating perceptions of safety and bicycle theft risk in the analysis of cycling infrastructure preferences. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, *150*, 285-301.
Wang, Z., Zhang, F., & Wu, F. (2017). Social trust between rural migrants and urban locals in China–Exploring the effects of residential diversity and neighbourhood deprivation. *Population, Space and Place*, *23*(1), e2008.
Warren; C. (2016) Black care. *Liquid Blackness* 3(6):36-47.
Wilson, H. (2011) Passing propinquities in the multicultural city: The everyday encounters of bus passengering. *Environment and Planning A* 43: 634.649.
Zimmer, T.A. (1979) The impact of Watergate on the public trust in people and confidence in the mass media. *Social Science Quarterly* 59(4):743-751.8